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ABSTRACT 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
Diaspora-Driven Development in Stateless Somalia: 
All Relationships are Local Relationships 
 
By Joseph Alan Scheibel 
 
Under the Supervision of Dr. Ibrahim Elnur 
 
 
Abstract:  In the wake of state collapse, Somali society today has become decidedly 
globalized, leaning heavily on capital from its widely-dispersed diaspora funneled in 
through the conduits of an informal economic system for both subsistence and overall 
economic livelihood.  Despite the great distances often separating them, Somalis remain 
linked by common ethnic and cultural bonds. These links are both social and economic, 
and are heavily reliant on telecommunications technology, a key concept discussed in this 
study.  The Somali economy, driven largely by the widespread informal Hawalaad 
financial transfer system, bypasses the commercial and financial channels that have been 
voided by the lack of a state; it instead largely emphasizes societal networks and cultural 
norms. This study examines how the Somali commercial diaspora has made extensive use 
of these informal avenues to invest in their homeland. 
 
Special attention is paid to the nature of Somali social networking; the establishment and 
maintenance of trust, in commercial endeavors undertaken in an unstable environment.  
This in turn illustrates the notion that despite unstable, often hostile conditions inhibiting 
most commercial endeavors in a conflict-ridden state or a state in a complex emergency 
situation, different segments of the Somali diaspora have come into a position to make 
unique contributions towards development in their homeland.  While the most evident 
and most analyzed of these contributions are taking place in the informal finance and 
telecommunications sectors, this thesis also suggests a gradual expansion of diaspora 
endeavors into other facets of development, including transport, health, and other basic 
services. 
 
This thesis argues that despite the absence of a government, Somalia's commercial 
diaspora has been able to not only cope and devise creative solutions to replace certain 
critical services lost in the vacuum left by the collapse of the government, but also in 
facilitating a degree of development as well.  This development is shaped and directed by 
the endogenous cultural attributes of Somali society, and contribute to improved 
standards of living and livelihoods for certain sectors of Somali society that would 
otherwise be worse-off. 
 
Keywords: Somalia, Somali Diaspora, Development, Telecommunications, Hawalaad 
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CHAPTER 1: ALL RELATIONSHIPS ARE LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS 
"We are a nation of immigrants who depend on other immigrants" 
                    – anonymous Somali saying coined in mid-2000s 
 
Somali society today has become decidedly globalized, leaning heavily on its wide-
ranging diaspora and a largely informal economic system for subsistence and overall 
economic livelihood. It is interconnected by common societal bonds, but through 
diverse mediums which vary from the latest telecommunications technologies to 
neighborhood relations.  Today, the lack of effective government in conjunction with 
far-flung migrant populations has necessitated the rise of a powerful informal 
economy. This informal economy bypasses the commercial and financial channels that 
have been voided by the lack of a state; it instead largely emphasizes societal networks 
and cultural norms. The Somali diaspora has made extensive use of these informal 
avenues, with remittances maintaining familial and clan links in a number of ways.  
Remittances may alternately go towards keeping a group of extended family members 
fed, or may be an investment in any number of diaspora-driven commercial or 
development endeavors.   
 
Over the past twenty years, the role of diaspora contribution in development has 
become increasingly important to development practitioners and policymakers alike.  
Diaspora- driven endeavors in the home country manifest itself in a number of useful 
ways, including remittances, investment, philanthropy, home or host country lobbying 
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and advocacy, and international business networking.  Statistics are far from 
exhaustive in describing any aspect of diaspora-driven development, and literature 
pertinent to the role diaspora in development during post-conflict periods is very 
limited. This is particularly true in the case of Somalia.  However, the limited analysis 
and prognostication available is telling.  According to a United Nations Development 
Program estimate done in 2004, approximately US$700 million dollars had been sent 
back to Somalia from the diaspora each year in the four years previous, and that the 
totals seemed to be trending upwards.  The bulk of this money is sent through almost 
purely informal avenues, namely the Somali Hawalaad informal financial transfer 
system which will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.  
 
In addition to forming a crucial pillar in the day-to-day survival and livelihood for a 
much of Somali society, diaspora remittances also serve as some of the largest 
catalysts for development on the larger, more macro-economic levels within Somalia.  
Even though it is always useful to distinguish the differences between economic 
growth and development, it is clear that development will not occur without economic 
growth or recovery in a post-conflict or conflicted area.  Development in this study 
will be defined as sustained economic growth that is shaped and directed by the 
endogenous factors of Somali society.  Those factors relate and contribute to improved 
standards of living and livelihoods for sectors of Somali society that would otherwise 
be worse-off.  According to the UNDP's 2007 Millennium Development Goals for 
Somalia report, remittances have increasingly gone towards helping their brethren 
develop and expand both small and large-scale business enterprises.  Diaspora 
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entrepreneurs have been largely responsible for the evolution of Somalia's 
telecommunications system.  Today, Somalia has one of, if not the most, efficient and 
affordable telecommunications networks in Africa, with international cell phone 
calling rates among the lowest in the world.1
 
  Somalia’s private sector has taken the 
lead in terms of providing other vital social services, including basic remittance 
banking and security.  Additionally, water, electricity, and transport services in 
Somalia are provided by what would normally be described as the private sector.  
Within the UNDP report, it was indicated that privately provided social goods such as 
in the education and health care sectors are actually growing, although they remain 
woefully inadequate in the perpetually conflicted state.  There is clearly valuable 
insight to be gained from research within this field, and the case study of Somalia 
offers a unique perspective within this critical area of study.  
However, analytic forays into this phenomenal circumstance must also endeavor to 
avoid portraying an overly optimistic portrait of life in Somalia, especially since 
contemporary developments such as the continued outbreaks of violence, open Somali 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and continued faltering and failure in 
more traditional political forums have illustrated how much more there is much to 
pessimistic about.  Somalis constitute one of the most dispersed peoples in the world, 
with substantial diaspora populations on several continents.  The United States 
Department of State reports over 67,000 Somali refugees admitted into the United 
States since 1980, and that figure does not account migrants who took other paths to 
                                                 
1 "Somalia Calling: An Unlikely Success Story." The Economist, December 2005, 13. 
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the same place or for the children of Somali migrants born in United States.2   
According to the United Kingdom's 2001 Census, around 43,500 Somalis were 
residing in the country.3  However, as with the United States, this is figure is believed 
to be widely underestimated due to a host of factors including generational issues and 
underreporting on behalf of migrants living in violation of population codes.  Expert 
estimates on the Somali population in the UK range from 95,000 to 250,000.4
 
  
This wide diffusion is an obvious negative reflection of Somalia's status in itself.  The 
lifeline of informal financial transfer networks came under highly-publicized scrutiny 
in the initial years of the "War on Terror" era.  While this negative attention died down 
somewhat in the mid-2000s, recent reports of diaspora involvement in destabilizing 
the transitional government, funding gunmen or militiamen, and contributing logistical 
and money-laundering support during the spate of open-water piracy occurring off of 
Somalia's coasts is likely to reignite security-driven inquiry into Somali diaspora-
relations by migrant-hosting nations.  These looming developments will likely weigh 
heavily against any positive progress spawned from those same societal links.  
However, before one can preclude the system as simply a conduit for counter-
productive or destabilizing activities, it is vital to analyze it from a developmental 
standpoint. 
                                                 
2 "Refugee Admissions Program for Africa: Fact Sheet February 6, 2009." US Department of State. 
Available from http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/117279.htm. Internet; accessed 13 April 2009. 
3 "Born Abroad: An Immigration Map of Britain: Somalia." BBC News. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/somalia.stm. Internet; accessed 
13 April 2009. 
4 Casciani, Dominic. "Somalis' Struggle in the UK." BBC News.  30 May 2006. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/5029390.stm. Accessed 13 April 2009. 
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1.1 Statement of Problem and Rationale of Study 
 
It is within the unique framework of Somalia, a political void in which the economies 
that function are largely driven by those outside of the state, that the unique 
advantages and disadvantages of diaspora influence and informal economic practices 
within development can be most clearly highlighted.  This in turn illustrates the notion 
that despite unstable, often hostile conditions inhibiting most commercial endeavors in 
a conflict-ridden state or a state in a complex emergency situation, different segments 
of the Somali diaspora have over time found themselves in a position to make unique 
contributions to reconstruction or development during perpetually difficult times.   
 
Contemporary academic works on Somalia often invoke two starkly contradicting 
senses; that of economic optimism, relying wholly on Somalia's unique, constantly 
evolving, essentially stateless manifestation of capitalism, and the sense of political 
pessimism that has come to define this territory within the Horn of Africa over the past 
decades. An attempt must be made to address these paradoxical notions 
simultaneously in order for a more practical understanding to come about.  This paper 
will seek to explain and connect the relationship between an informal economy and 
diaspora-driven development, with a special emphasis on the role of technological 
change in facilitating this relationship. 
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It should also be said that no matter how the relationship between those two 
conflicting notions plays out in academic forums, there is no arguing that the case of 
Somalia challenges many well-established notions within the social sciences 
concerning economics, governance, and institutions.  Much of what is transpiring 
today in Somalia has clear relevance well beyond its own borders.  
 
1.2 A Failed State and the Rise of the Informal Economy 
 
The historical context surrounding the Somali informal economy's rise to prominence 
is a bleak one: the collapse of the state causes complete failure in most of the already 
sub-par public institutions such as hospitals and schools, creating an entire generation 
of children and young adults with no semblance of formal education, and harsh 
conditions contributing to negative sentiments and discrimination in an already highly 
segmented clan-based society.  Within a society in which many still adhere to the 
traditional lifestyles of pastoral nomadism, the notion of a central state in Somalia has 
always been elusive. Indeed, the fall of Barre simply validated the beliefs and 
expectations of many Somalis both inside and outside the country.  The paradox of the 
Somali economy has been written on extensively in recent years; it has been shown 
that, despite the collapse of the state and instable conditions, many sectors of the 
Somali economy are doing quite well, fairing better under this sort of laissez faire than 
they ever had during the pre-war and pre-collapse years.5
                                                 
5 Nenova, Tatiana, and Tim Harford. "Anarchy and Investion: How Does Somalia's Private Sector Cope 
without Government?." The World Bank Group Public Policy for the Private Sector, no. 280 (2004): 1. 
  Clearly, this success is not 
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mirrored across all of Somali society itself, but there are certainly segments of the 
population benefiting from these circumstances. 
 
It is within the avenues of an economy without a state that societal and local links at 
the global level have been facilitated. Existing literature has shown that some 
measures of economic success in post-conflict states are intrinsically correlated to 
diaspora activity, and the Somali case offers concrete links between diaspora and 
development, with those links being forged within the context of informal economic 
activities. This is particularly the case when one assumes that the conclusion of 
conflict acts as a catalyst for sending remittances, as well as serving as a green light 
for diaspora investment and philanthropic endeavors.  While these more constructive 
reasons are not the sole catalysts for remittance-sending back home, analyzing this 
dynamic is vital to ascertaining what works in terms of stability-building and 
development.  Dating back to the mid 1970s, there has been a perceived reciprocal 
relationship between modernization and diasporas. This notion was argued initially in 
John.A. Armstrong's article "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas" found in The 
American Political Science Review in 1976, and has only been reinforced in 
subsequent works, such as those by Devesh Kapur in 2004, Awil Mohamoud in 2006 
and Manuel Orozco in 2007.   
 
 
1.3 A Brief Overview of the Distribution of the Somali Diaspora: 
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Fluidity in living situations is a central aspect of Somali culture, as evidenced by the 
historic pastime of pastoral nomadism. This lifestyle traditionally involved long cycles 
of regular internal migration in order adapt to the changing climates and seasonal 
shifts. This lifestyle has also been reinforced by today's requirements of fluidity in 
Somali business and trading markets, fluidity that is necessary to keep up with outside 
trading in order to sustain or enhance their current lifestyle. 
 
One of the earliest Somali diasporas emerged during the period of British colonialism. 
Many sailors of northern Somali origin were serving in the Merchant Navy, and ended 
up settling permanently in the British cities of London and Cardiff.6  Despite 
migrating before the telecommunications boom and being relatively small in number, 
these migrants maintained their Somali identity.  They remained in touch with kin still 
resident in Somalia and ultimately laid an important foundation for the UK Somali 
diaspora that would become vital to the livelihoods of a greatly increased number of 
persons in the coming decades.7
 
 
In the 1960s, a second small wave of migration occurred when a substantial 
percentage of supporters of the Somali Youth League, hailing particularly from the 
north-western Isaaq clans, were forced to leave the country after having their assets 
and economic mobility critically reduced.  Beginning in 1973, tens of thousands of 
                                                 
6 Farah, Nurrudin. Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora. London, UK: Cassel 
Publishers, 2000. 100. 
7 Lindley, Anna. "The early morning phone call: Remittances from a refugee diaspora perspective." 
Centre on Migration, Policy, and Study Working Paper Series, no. 47 (2007): 5-6. 
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Somalis departed their homeland en route to the Arab Gulf States. Somalia quickly 
became a large labor exporter to the oil producing countries, and estimates on the 
number of labor migrants during the Gulf oil boom range between 150,000 and 
200,000 Somalis.  Around half of these migrants again hailed from the Isaaq clan. The 
labor-migration cycle continued through the 1980s, gradually ramping up in size and 
scope. At the end of 1987, the number of Somali migrants working in the Gulf was 
believed to be between 375,000 and 400,000.  Most of these immigrants were fairly 
well-educated simply looking for better employment opportunities than could be 
found at home.8
 
   
The precursor to the next large wave of migration was set with the outbreak of the 
Ogaden war, in which Somali forces engaged Ethiopia in an attempt to gain control of 
the Ethiopian Ogaden region, which was inhabited by many ethnic Somalis. As the 
conflict broke out, refugees from the Ethiopian Ogaden poured into Somalia, and one 
estimate claims that in 1981, these refugees constituted perhaps 40 percent of 
Somalia's total population9
                                                 
8 Marchal, Roland. Final Report on the Post Civil War Somali Business Class. Paris, France: European 
Commission, Somali Unit, 1996. 
. However, the veracity of this claim has been doubted as 
an exaggeration.  Regardless, the opening shots of the civil war in 1988 quickly 
reversed this flow, with approximately 600,000 Somalis pouring into the Ethiopian 
Ogaden. As the war continued, hundreds of thousands of Somalis departed their 
homeland for neighboring nations and hosts outside of Africa.  The bulk of the 
9 Waldron, Sydney & Hasci, Naima. Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa, State of the Art Literature 
Review. RSP Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief Report Three. Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies 
Programme, 1995. 4. 
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refugees were poorer and unable to flee much further than Kenya or Ethiopia10
 
.  
However, many of the more well-off refugees, often educated or accomplished 
businesspeople headed to Western countries such as the UK, the United States, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Canada, or Australia. 
Within a rather short period of time, a noticeable networking effect began to set in.  
These Somali groups in the West were able to adapt to their host countries and ingrain 
themselves in differing capacities in those countries' commercial sectors. These early 
diaspora populations can be seen as an early contemporary manifestation of Castell's 
Network Society, wherein globalization becomes essentially an extension of trust 
networks.11
                                                 
10 Lewis, Ioan. Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History, and Social Institutions. London, 
UK: Haan Associates, 1993. 61. 
  These proto-diasporas were laying important groundwork for future 
waves of migrants, facilitating a much more rapid adaption to the host country with 
pre-existent community and employment networks. This dynamic became noticeable 
only a few years after the opening shots of the Ogaden War; the flow of Somali 
refugees to the West increased exponentially as the government in Mogadishu 
collapsed and civil war broke out in the early 1990s.  During these waves of migration, 
many Somalis "piggy-backed" their way into pre-established Somali diaspora 
communities both in the West and in neighboring countries. Some of the notable 
centers of Somali diaspora include Portland, Maine; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and 
Tucson, Arizona in the United States, and London, England, as well as Stockholm, 
Sweden.  Nairobi, Kenya received a huge number of Somali refugees as well.  The 
 
11 Castells, Manuel. "Toward a Sociology of the Network Society." Contemporary Sociology, no. 29 
(2000): 694. 
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diaspora "infrastructure," is constantly developing, forged by smaller numbers of prior 
migrants to these countries. The earliest example of such diaspora "infrastructure" 
being implemented in the West occurred with the Somali seamen in the Merchant 
Navy settling mentioned previously settling in the UK.  
 
While most of Somalia's contemporary migration flow has been intrinsically 
correlated to armed conflict, the flow of migration to the Arab Gulf States was sparked 
purely by enhanced economic opportunities.  The lack of employment in Somalia in 
conjunction with the rapid development of the Gulf oil sector combined to create an 
environment in which a key pillar of the Somali diaspora was forged.  In the early 
1990s, the allure of migration was two-fold, encompassing both the escape from 
conflict at home as well as much wider economic opportunities. 
 
In a trend that began with the oil boom in the Gulf and perhaps peaked in the mid-
1980s, Somalis who had the means to migrate would do so. Refugees who were able 
to reach Western countries found themselves in a situation similar to Somalis in the 
Gulf States, in that they were looking for employment in a host land with substantially 
more opportunities than at home. These two trends of growth in the diaspora are where 
the avenues of informal economics become a staple of survival for relatives left behind 
in Somalia.   
 
1.4 Diasporic Roles in Somalia Today 
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The role of any sizable diaspora today is wholly multifaceted, and cannot be singularly 
defined or categorized within a single sector.  Furthermore, the Somali diaspora 
cannot be characterized as a singular entity with uniform motives and goals.  
However, in a conflict or post-conflict situation, the diaspora wields substantial 
influence in private, public, and non-profit capacities.  This influence is augmented by 
the dynamic networks and relations that were already in place, such as the ethnic or 
clan-based networks, and also by networks spawning from the conflict itself.  It should 
be noted that the potential benefits of commercial diaspora-driven development are 
great, but have often yet to be fully realized.  Certain segments of the Somali diaspora, 
notably successful entrepreneurs and former state elites, have met limited yet 
interesting successes back within their homeland, and the oft-ravaged economy in a 
virtually lawless state has benefited immensely from remittances coming from all 
Somali people ranging from commercial entrepreneurs to refugees residing abroad, 
most of whom seem to reap benefits from comparative economic success in which 
country is their host.12
 
  Different segments of the diaspora have different capital 
resources, and will direct those resources to varying endeavors in Somalia, from 
prospective commercial investments to keeping family members fed.  In subsequent 
chapters, the Somali-specific informal system of financial transfer, known as the 
Hawalaad, will be discussed in depth.  
While Somalia's diaspora today often serves as the financial backbone of daily life for 
many still within the relatively ungoverned country, it is important to note that it has 
                                                 
12 Campbell, Elizabeth. "Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade 
networks in Nairobi." Global Migration Perspectives, no. 47 (2005): 19. 
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historically played a massive role inside Somalia.  This is evidenced by estimates of 
remittances flowing into Somalia valued at almost US$340 million in 1985,13 years 
before the fall of Barre and at the height of the state's attempted interference in market 
matters. This figure alone is almost fifteen times greater than the entire country's wage 
bill in formal business for that year.14  While the function of diaspora in development 
has become increasingly important to practitioners and policy-makers alike, 
particularly through philanthropy, lobbying, and international business networking, the 
indirect-investment role of the commercial diaspora is quietly driving perhaps the 
most vital aspects of development within Somalia itself.  Additionally, members of the 
diaspora frequently visit home, and exercise their political and commercial influence 
in person.  The "'Season of Diaspora'" occurs between June and September, and is a 
phenomenon that occurs in many parts of the world besides Somalia.  In 2000, the 
United Nations Development Program estimated that some 15,000 members of the 
diaspora returned to Somaliland alone for the summer,15
 
 providing a sharp increase in 
revenue flow into the territory. 
 
1.5 Tempering Optimism With Reality 
 
                                                 
13 Jamal, Vali. "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy." Development and Change, no. 
19 (1988): 205. 
14 Simons, Anna. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
127. 
15 Bradbury, Mark, Kenneth Menkhaus, and Roland Marchal. Human Development Report Somalia 
2001. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Development Program, 2001. 61. 
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While the case of Somalia is clearly an extreme one, there is certainly valuable insight 
to glean that may be applicable both to other regions in the world contending with 
nonexistent or ineffective governance, conflict at the sub-regional level, or a faltering 
economy of the traditional mold.  Somalia could be loosely defined as something of a 
"transnational territory," with so many of its citizens residing abroad and so much of 
its economic produced external to the geographic boundaries of the state itself. Core 
societal values of cultural and ethnic ties are reinforced with technology, a trend that 
has been noticeable in other parts of the world today. Somalia could be seen as an 
archetypal, yet extreme, entry along a progression from the sovereign state system to 
one more towards a wholly globalized society that still maintains its defined ethnic 
and cultural identities.  
 
However, very important questions are raised concerning the "governance" capacity of 
such an unorthodox system.  Indeed, it has been evidenced within the Somali case that 
the high flow of unregulated, unmonitored finances, information, and ideas continues 
to contribute to the political impasse facing the region within the traditional echelons 
of governance. Despite the fact that certain aspects of the Somali commercial or 
trading sectors have done exceedingly well in this environment, the territory is still 
faced with chronic political instabilities, bouts of violence, and an abysmal shortage of 
public institutions.  Many of these widespread social, ethnic, and economic problems 
appear to be cyclical, and while from certain viewpoints they are becoming more 
manageable, the severity of the problems does not seem to actually be lessening.  The 
unusual paradox of Somali statehood has forced the creation of alternate modes of 
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economics and, in doing so, created a number of unique opportunities.  Some have 
benefited disproportionately from these opportunities, while many others have found 
their survival alone wholly reliant on the same opportunities. There are many more 
losers than winners in this system, and school-age children, women, and minority 
groups are the most clearly inhibited by the system in place today. 
 
A huge number of Somalis remain outside of their homelands; many reside in squalid 
refugee enclaves in neighboring countries, while others have fled to Europe, North 
America, and the Arabian Gulf. The fact that Somalis are so widely dispersed in such 
high numbers, and the differences in diaspora living conditions so disparate, provides 
adequate testimony to the fact that things are far from well in their homeland.  While 
this analysis will take into account the negative ramifications of the aforementioned 
systems and relationships, its primary goal is to explore the positive aspects and distill 
notions that may be beneficial in terms of understanding or encouraging development 
or order in other conflicted parts of the world.  This information will be particularly 
relevant for states have far-flung diaspora populations abroad, while failing to provide 
basic public services and continuing to struggle with violence and control at home.  
The subsequent chapter in this study aims to build a conceptual framework that 
adequately encompasses all of these themes. 
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CHAPTER 2: ESTABLISHING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In recent years interest in the transnational activities of migrants and Somalis in 
particular has amplified. Adequately addressing the myriad of theoretical aspects 
involved with migration, remittances, and informal economies could quickly fill the 
pages of several volumes. This chapter attempt to address the key theoretical aspects 
relevant to the subject at hand, while simultaneously aspiring to encapsulate some of 
the more peripheral theories applicable to this study.   
 
Within this study of the case of Somalia, relevant theories can fall into a number of 
frameworks; Section 2.1 will discuss the migration-development nexus, with a focus 
on the formation of transnational networks and remittance-sending within Somali 
society. Section 2.2 will explore the formal/informal dynamic in Somalia, particularly 
with regards to the informal financial sector and the role of the diaspora in 
contributing to its prevalence. Section 2.3 will examine the implications of 
telecommunications between diaspora relations and development, while section 2.4 
will attempt to tie all of these elements together with the introduction of the Somali   
informal financial transfer system, a component to this study that embodies the 
theoretical linkages between each of the aforementioned ideas.
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2.1 Migration and Remittances in Development 
 
Throughout history, remittances have contributed to development, not only in 
financial terms but also in terms of knowledge, skills, and culture.  An economy based 
on remittances rather than local production can therefore see the external actors play a 
much larger role in determining the trajectory of development and in certain cases, the 
nature of the state itself.  Migrants often maintain multiple forms of ties to their home 
countries and home communities, and this relationship opens the door for the flow of 
capital and knowledge from one side to the other.  According to the International 
Monetary Fund, the value of remittances continues to trend upwards, while foreign 
direct investment globally has trended down over the past decade.1  Additionally, 
remittances transferred home by migrant workers abroad have been between two to 
four times larger than the volume of international aid since the early 1990s.2
FIGURE 1. Remittances vs. Other Capital Flow to Developing Countries
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1 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook April 2005: Globalization and External 
Imbalances. Published by International Monetary Fund Publishing Services, 2005. 70. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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The value of remittances often goes beyond the more easily measurable dimensions of 
economics. Because they generally have higher levels of education and experience, 
members of a diaspora have the capacity to provide valuable assistance or advice on 
economic priorities in reconstruction.  Diaspora entrepreneurs are also key innovators, 
and the transfer of skills and knowledge is invaluable.  Diaspora entrepreneurs are also 
adept at introducing new technologies to their home country, which in Somalia has 
been demonstrated in the telecommunications and business sectors, and to a lesser 
extent, the health and education sectors.4  In addition, sustainable business with solid 
financial assets allows a diaspora member to pursue development endeavors on a 
broader scale at home.  This is noticeable in the Somali case, as the distinction 
between economic migrant and refugee is often fuzzy, particularly in Western 
countries. Many within the Somali diaspora are merchants, businessmen, or otherwise 
integrated commercially either within the local networks or that of their host 
countries.5
 
 
Additionally, in today's age of cheap, accessible telecommunications and increasingly 
affordable transportation, the act of emigrating no longer necessarily constitutes a 
break from the home society.  However, with the unique system of clan-based ethnic 
ties, the notion of a societal disconnect between a migrant and the home country has 
never been quite as applicable to much of Somalia's diaspora, and the aforementioned 
                                                 
4 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International 
Africa Institute, 2008. 177. 
5 Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." In The Migration-
Development Nexus, eds. Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Sorenson, 233-258. Geneva, Switzerland, 2003. 
The International Organization for Migration. 247. 
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technological change has only served to refute that notion even more.  Somali society 
today serves as an exemplary example of British sociologist Anthony Giddens' notion 
that globalization extends and reinforces communities built on trust.6  Somalis have a 
traditional reliance on networking within their society, and this vital form of social 
networking has manifested itself on the global level. These transnational networks 
play a crucial role in migration flows originating from any country; family or friends 
working abroad can drastically ease the process of relocation for new migrants.7  This 
relationship has been demonstrated in both the context of Western host countries as 
well as in the context of Somalia's neighboring, refugee-harboring states such as 
Kenya.8  This dynamic is self-reinforcing, as it simultaneously improves the diaspora 
communities' resources while amplifying that particular migration flow from home to 
destination countries.9
 
   
While this notion may apply to virtually every diaspora community, the communal 
structure of Somali society simultaneously grows yet simplifies that transnational 
network.  One must take into account the kinship groups, or ethnic linkages, that are 
the basic building blocks of Somali society.  Studies on the sociology and genealogy 
that constitute Somali clanship and social affiliation could fill volumes, but what is 
most important are the clear loyalties and partiality that stem from these relationships. 
With social obligations and clan tie-ins, Somali transnational networking seems to 
                                                 
6 Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
112-114. 
7 Farah, Nurrudin. Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora. London, UK: Cassel 
Publishers, 2000. 101. 
8 Campbell, Elizabeth. "Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade networks 
in Nairobi." Global Migration Perspectives, no. 47 (2005): 12. 
9 Lucas, Robert. International Migration and Economic Development: Lessons from Low-Income 
Countries. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 2005. 207. 
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bring an obvious "village" networking dynamic up to the global level. While these 
clan or community level international networks are beneficial to a great many people 
who fall under that umbrella, it should remembered that this system is far from ideal 
and in the past 20 years largely necessary for survival.  For example, most efforts 
towards an "ethnic unity" have generally failed, and modern Somali nationalists seem 
to have underestimated the divisive power of these different heritages.10
 
Another distinctive element in analysis of the Somali diaspora alluded to earlier is that 
the distinction between refugees and economic migrants as remitters is not as 
pronounced at it is with other diaspora communities. In fact, this distinction may be 
meaningless, as virtually all refugees, including those who fled to Europe or the 
United States as well as those who fled to neighboring countries such as Kenya have 
subsequently pursued employment and commercial endeavors with some degree of 
success.
  This was 
brought to light in the harshest sense following the fall of Barre in 1990 and the 
subsequent outbreak of ethnically-driven violence. However, there are clearly 
elements of a greater resilience and an inductive adaptability to these bonds, which is 
what the author aims to explore. 
11
                                                 
10 Lewis, Ioan. "Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox." Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, no. 74 (2004): 491. 
  In later chapters, the various mechanisms of the Somali diaspora's 
involvement in commercial affairs will be discussed in several settings and at varying 
dimensions of business.  Some migrants may simply open an internet café or 
telephone calling center, while others have had great success with much larger 
11 Campbell, Elizabeth. "Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade 
networks in Nairobi." Global Migration Perspectives, no. 47 (2005): 14. 
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business endeavors such as regional airlines or organized telecommunications service 
providers.  The distinction between economic migrant and refugee is further blurred 
when one considers the Somali peoples' traditional pastime of pastoral nomadism.  
Many Somalis' history is rooted in constant migration and the pursuit of an improved 
livelihood. Virtually all of Somalia's diaspora populations could be considered 
commercially-involved diasporas at some level, with the possible exception of certain 
refugee communities that have been marginalized to the point where efforts to get 
involved in local business or trading are completely impaired. 
 
The bottom line is that investment, trade, and development efforts in Somalia rely 
heavily on remittances, and in some cases are driven exclusively by remittances and 
diaspora efforts.  In addition to keeping family members fed, diaspora money is 
crucial for investment in businesses of varying scale, real estate investment12 and 
community-oriented development projects.13  Diaspora remittances, as it was hinted to 
above, play an important role as an economic multiplier. They spawn businesses and 
developments in the service sector, such as telecommunications, market broker 
services, hotels, and even transport.  Their benefits are apparent in the productive 
sector too as they generate new sources of income.  In more hospitable situations, 
remittances have also been shown to help pay help fund broader goods, such as 
education and health.14
                                                 
12 Omer, Abdusalam, and Gina El Koury. "Regulation and Supervision in a Vacuum: The Story of the 
Somali Remittance Sector." In Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects, eds. Samuel 
Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, 226-243. Washington, DC, 2005. The World Bank. 230. 
  
13 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 14. 
14 Johnson, Paula. "Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues." The Philanthropic 
Initiative & The Global Equity Initiative Joint Working Paper, Harvard University Press, (2007). 7.  
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At the macro-economic level, remittances constitute far and away largest inflow of 
hard currency in Somalia, with Somali livestock trade and contributions from 
international aid providing auxiliary sources of hard currency.  Maintaining that flow 
of hard currency is vital in maintaining any sort of economic stability.  Remittances 
form a key pillar on which an informal economy has been able to survive and grow.  
The importance of the distinction between formal and informal in Somali affairs will 
be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
 
On the political dimension, the situation becomes murkier.  Diaspora remittances have 
been shown to fund destabilizing political activities, and perhaps even more 
worrisome are the recent indications that a segment of the diaspora has become 
involved in direct tactical and logistical planning in the recent spate of open water 
piracy.15  However, there are still inherent benefits to remittances and remittance-
driven efforts in business or development.  The private sector can serve as a major 
contributor to peace and stability.  Improved livelihoods, more employment, and the 
myriad of other opportunities associated with economic successes are generally 
considered landmarks on the road towards a more content and stable population. In the 
Somali case specifically, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that inter and intra-clan-
based hostility, antagonism, and general aversion has been profoundly de-emphasized 
when faced with both the prospect of successful business,16
                                                 
15 "Somali piracy backed by international network." Associated Press 11 December 2008. Accessed on 
December 28, 2008, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28158455/. 
 with a similar dynamic 
16 Simons, Anna. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
115. 
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being shown at a broader political level during internationally-backed peace 
conferences.17
 
 
A good example of this can be found in the breakaway territory of Somaliland, where 
the governance has not been afraid to lean on diaspora relations, has enjoyed relative 
success and stability. Diaspora interests, through funding or political prodding, have 
facilitated much of the development success and improve political stability in the 
fledgling government.18  The far-flung Somali expatriate communities have served as 
a vital pillar in both the economic and political role at the naissance of Somaliland, 
and have been equally important in maintaining social and governmental stability.  
The Somaliland diaspora has been encouraged to interface with the various transitional 
and interim governance systems that have come about since it declared its 
independence from Somalia in 1991.  In doing so, Somaliland has been able to largely 
bypass the more volatile aspects of inter-clan relations found in Somalia.19  Despite 
the lack of international recognition and thus any influx of international aid, and an 
economy that was drastically inhibited by a livestock import ban in Saudi Arabia, the 
diaspora has been able to provide sufficient support to keep the fledgling territory 
afloat.20
                                                 
17 Zunzer, Wolfram. "Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation." Berghof Research 
Center Occasional Paper Series, no. 26 (2004): 33. 
  With heavy diaspora involvement and investment, the recent iterations of the 
Somaliland government has begun pursuing a number of interesting development 
18 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues:Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International 
Africa Institute, 2008. 7. 
19 Gettleman, Jeffrey, "Somaliland is an overlooked African success story," International Herald 
Tribune, 7 March 2007. Accessed on 6 January, 2008 from 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/07/news/somalia.php. 
20Lindley, Anna. Migrant Remittances in the Context of Crisis in Somali Society: A Case Study of 
Hargeisa. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2006. 16  
 24 
projects, from the provision of important civil infrastructure and social services to land 
mine removal and refugee repatriation endeavors.   
 
The make-up of the Somali diaspora has changed substantially over time, but the 
practice of regular remittances has remained steady.  The notable differences have 
been in the area of what the remittances have been used for and what they are put 
towards today.  As mentioned before, early waves of economic migrants from Somalia 
to the Gulf tended to favor trading and small investment.  Waves of migration sparked 
by conflict saw refugees remitting to support families, while former state elites began 
investing in larger endeavors from the outside their homeland.  According to Joakim 
Gundel's piece in the United Nations' The Migration Development Nexus, around two-
thirds of remittances to Somalia during the 70s and 80s were put towards trading and 
small business endeavors, while the other third was relegated to family assistance and 
support.  In the 2000s, Gundel cites French political analyst and researcher Marc 
Antoine Perouse de Montclos' estimates that this figure has reversed, with the majority 
of remittances being relegated to day-to-day necessities for families.  However, as will 
be argued in chapters five and six, it seems that diaspora business endeavors during 
the 1990s and 2000s have become anything but more pronounced. 
 
This trend also leads to some substantial worries today among Somalis about the long-
term prospects of sustained remittance patterns.  Generally speaking, as diaspora 
populations mature in their host countries, familial relations tend to decline.  Several 
works have indicated that, over time, diaspora involvement in home affairs has 
 25 
decreased, most notably in times of relative stability. This raises a number of 
important questions; concerning whether or not the diaspora lifeline is a self-defeating 
form and whether or not the seemingly resolute and solid cultural and ethnic bonds 
between clans and families will eventually fray from distance despite technological 
innovation.  
 
This informal system has allowed for some individuals to accumulate wealth far 
beyond what may have happened operating under the central bank of a state, but for 
the majority of the population it is those exact same open avenues of an informal 
economy that are vital to their very survival. Remittances from relatives abroad 
continually offset the disparate gap between the average Somali worker's miniscule 
salary and the cost of basic needs. This link has been a fixture of Somali society long 
prior to the fall of Barre and the subsequent collapse of the state, and despite questions 
about future generations, continues to serve a vital role today. 
 
 
2.2 The Diaspora-Telecommunications Development Nexus 
 
The linkages between the diaspora and telecommunications development are 
extremely interesting and represents a serious gap in the literature.  Today, the 
practical relationship between a diaspora and telecommunications technology is 
evident in any call center, internet café, or cellular phone in both home and host 
country. This day-to-day relationship, near impossible two decades ago, has been 
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facilitated by technological advances directly augmenting pre-existing cultural ties. 
Outside of maintaining familial relations, telecommunications technology has also 
opened the doors for a myriad of other, more development oriented networks to 
develop, namely in business and trading.  The evolution of telecommunications in 
Somalia over the past 15 years is a fascinating instance of development, and may 
potentially serve as a pre-cursor model for subsequent community-oriented modes of 
diaspora driven-development. 
 
From a root theoretical standpoint, diaspora-driven development may follow a similar 
arc to that of telecommunications driven development. Parallels are clear in terms of 
the spread of the development and wide nature found in the distribution of benefits.  
For example, one can take into consideration the unique benefits of 
telecommunications development and see them mirrored or expounded upon in 
correlation with the development of diasporas or diaspora networks. 
 
The proliferation of telecommunications technology and reasonable public access to it 
is often followed by declining average costs across the economy.21
                                                 
21 Nathaniel Leff. "Externalities, Information Costs, and Social Benefit Cost-Analysis for Economic 
Develoment: An Example from Telecommunications." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
no. 32 (1984): 257-258. 
  Better information 
relay and decision-making processes inherently increases productivity and may also 
produce more supplies of capital.  Increased development in the system also leads to a 
fall in costs of supplying services to prior subscribers.  In contrast with other sectors in 
development, telecommunications is wholly adaptable to virtually any operational 
sector that it is supplying, ranging from the grass roots level up through large 
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commercial and industrial operations.  Telecommunications is not particularly specific 
to demand from a particular industry or individual.  If a drastic market shift suddenly 
favors one product at the expense of another, the telecommunications sector is 
generally equally suited to facilitating the production of either. As stated by Castells, 
"Electronic communication systems give networks the capacity to decentralize and 
adapt to the execution of tasks while coordinating purpose and decision making.  
Therefore, flexibility can be achieved without sacrificing performance."22  
Additionally, telecommunications infrastructure itself is inexpensive, quickly 
implemented, and, perhaps most importantly, does not require a substantial amount of 
pre-existing level of technology or facilities to be put into operation. This allows for 
technological "leap-frogging," or essentially bypassing earlier communications 
technologies such as hard-wired phone lines without having any prerequisite 
technology base in place.23
 
 
It is in this vein that telecommunications development mirrors that of diaspora 
networking; namely that each new addition to the system essentially benefits every 
other node within the same network.24
                                                 
22 Castells, Manuel. "Toward a Sociology of the Network Society." Contemporary Sociology, no. 29 
(2000): 695. 
  This dynamic of geometrically spreading 
benefits is not found in more traditional means of development. For example, a 
potable water pipeline routed into Village C from a well in Village A really only 
benefits village C.  However, a cellular phone tower in Village C benefits Villages A, 
23 Sauter, Raphael, and Jim Watson. Technology Leapfrogging: A Review of the Evidence. Report for 
the DFID. Brighton-Sussex, UK: University of Sussex, 2008. 20. 
24 Roller, Lars Hendrick, and Leonard Weaverman. "Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic 
Development: A Simultaneous Approach." The American Economic Review, no. 91 (2001). 
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B, and C because they are now interconnected.  A parallel from this unique dynamic 
can be drawn to the proliferation and dispersion of a segmented diaspora. A diaspora 
with a presence in more places affords more opportunities in the economic and social 
senses in all directions, whether for future outward migrants or for finances or assets 
funneling into the home country.  Diaspora networks facilitate their own brand of 
"leap-frogging," perhaps in the job sector, allowing new migrants to bypass most of 
the acclamatory phases that are normally requisite in new job markets, and also by 
creating or building on home-host business networking relations that may not 
otherwise have existed without a diaspora presence. 
 
This parallel has been particularly evident in Somalia, despite the informal nature of 
the financial network.  Over the past two decades, technological developments in 
telecommunications have catalyzed diaspora-driven development across the globe, and 
particularly in the case of Somalia.25
 
  It is from here that we can delve into the notion 
that technological change may reinforce or even catalyze these cultural or ethnic ties.  
The idea of ethnic responsibility or affinity, in conjunction with modern 
communications technology, forges a tool uniquely suited for analyzing many facets 
of development or rebuilding in Somalia.  While much has been written about the 
virtues of telecommunications in development today, and the Somali diaspora has 
been frequently analyzed for its role in the country's internal affairs, no strong 
connections between the two have been established.   
                                                 
25 "Somalia Calling: An Unlikely Success Story." The Economist, December 2005, 14. 
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In addition to facilitating participation in the modern international community, 
efficient telecommunications inspires internal economic growth through many 
mediums and with many distinct outputs.26
 
  While organizations such as the World 
Bank and the International Telecommunications Union have conducted studies 
showing that telecommunications can amplify development capabilities across many 
sectors, no study has directly captured the effects of this technological evolution on 
the informal, ethnic-and-culturally driven financial mechanisms such as the 
Hawalaad.  As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, despite having existed for 
centuries before the advent of the internet or cellular telephones, the Hawalaad in its 
contemporary manifestations is clearly driven by the wave of telecommunications 
advancement that drove development across the globe. 
However, the avenues opened through technology are only one component to this 
equation, and one should remember that is the aforementioned cultural ties that are the 
sole intrinsic element to this dynamic.  While the core of a diaspora is often formed by 
conflict or overwhelming crisis, Somalis abroad representing various clans and sub-
clans have shown that each segment of their population in the diaspora represents a 
unique value. Mirroring the theoretical benefits of telecommunications development, 
the diaspora relationship is a connecting to a communications system that inherently 
increases the value of the system to all other participants.  As in a telecommunications 
network, these conceptual benefits will exponentially increase as more users are able 
to join the network.  There is no question that telecommunications enhances the 
                                                 
26 Hobday, Michael. Telecommunications in Developing Countries: The Challenge from Brazil. 
London, UK: Routledge, 1990. 
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effectiveness of the development process on the whole by increasing the output to cost 
ratio and helping to distribute information, and thus the benefits of development more 
evenly throughout the recipient base.   
 
Turning back to the relationship between technological change and diaspora relations, 
it should be noted that the stateless nature of Somalia and the interconnected nature of 
the culture formed perhaps the strongest laboratory for development driven through 
telecommunications during the boom that began in the 1990s. Compared to other 
sectoral entities, telecommunications most closely exhibits the drawbacks of provision 
by state-owned entities.27
 
  As institutions, the inflexible bureaucracy and self-
sustaining policies of a state-owned enterprise has traditionally been a major liability 
to telecommunications development, in that there is generally less incentive to keep up 
with the latest technologies or to expand the base of connected users.  
The initial waves of telecommunications development in the post-Cold War period 
initially bypassed much of the developing world, notably Africa and the Middle East.  
As noted by Muhammad Ayish in 1992, a lack of financial resources, rigid economic 
legislation, and socio-political obstacles had seemingly inhibited the bridging of the 
telecommunications development gap.28
                                                 
27 Wallsten, Scott. "An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in 
Africa and Latin America." The Journal of Industrial Economics, no. 49 (2001): 3. 
  However, Somalia was able to bridge this 
particular gap in spectacularly quick fashion. Within ten years of Ayish's observation, 
Somalia was in possession of the number one ranked cellular telephone network in all 
28 Ayish, Muhammad. "International Communications in the 1990s: Implications for the Third World." 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, no. 68 (1992): 487-510. 
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of Africa according to The Economist, ranking ahead of nations today considered to 
be telecommunications powerhouses such as Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia.  
 
In Somalia, this rapid technological evolution is certainly a response to the lack of an 
interfering state not only in terms of the freedom to implement a telecommunications 
network, but also the necessity of cultivating and maintaining the critical lifelines from 
Somalis abroad.  Consumer-driven policies are imperative to ferment growth and thus 
income, and Somalia as the stateless entity owns its own distorted outputs in this 
equation.  To state it succinctly, telecommunications is a rapidly evolving, 
technologically based sector, and Somalia itself is a rapidly evolving environment.   
 
However, one of the main theoretical benefits of telecommunications development has 
been noticeably absent in the case of Somalia. As the flow of information increases, 
generally stability and growth follow with it, both socially and economically.  
Elsewhere in the developing world, states are often bound to some measure or 
combination of socio-political instability, overbearing bureaucracy, or inadequate 
economic policies.  All of these factors lead to situations in which a substantial 
amount of uncertainty surrounds many economic decisions.  As was originally argued 
by David Apter in The Politics of Modernization in 1965, the simplest theoretical 
antidote for uncertainty is additional information.  Given the political and economic 
obstacles that have faced the countries in the developing world over the past decades, 
skepticism concerning the feasibility of stability is warranted.  However, as shown in 
the Somali case, it seems a state or governing body is not necessarily a requisite, and 
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that a population dedicated to flexibility and encouraging competition in the 
telecommunications sector can certainly reap the social and economic benefits 
attached to such development.   
 
 
2.3 The Formal/Informal Dynamic in Somalia 
 
Nowhere is the challenge of making the distinction between formal and informal as 
pronounced as it is in the case of Somalia.  The borders between many social 
phenomena are blurred, distorted, or intertwined within almost every aspect of 
Somalia's existence. This includes any distinctions between formal and informal, war 
and peace, government and non-government.  The distinction between "formal" and  
"informal" is most easily reduced to a simple question of legality, however the 
absence of a central government makes such questions meaningless. Considerable 
academic debate has taken place in the past concerning whether or not a state role in 
economy, specifically in financial institutions, is a requisite for a functional 
economy.29
 
  The case of Somalia puts this notion to the test more so than any other 
"state" or "stateless" area on the planet, and it is necessary to discuss these boundaries 
as preface to any discussion about how the economic situation in Somalia has 
unfolded and how it functions today. 
                                                 
29 Simmel, Georg. The Philosophy of Money. London, UK: Routledge, 2004. 180. 
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Over the past decades, Somalia's economic boundaries have been extremely hazy. 
Determining what constitutes formal or informal economic activity has always been 
troublesome, even during the period of a central government. If the definition of 
formal requires a state-based relationship, then the virtually the entire domestic 
economy of Somalia is completely informal, along with many parts of its external 
economy. Today, the Somali economy is not formally measured or even 
acknowledged by global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the 
World Bank. However, the country is recognized as a major exporter of livestock and 
fruit, and regularly receives foreign investment from very legitimate firms such as a 
General Motors subsidiary or Dole Fruit, and engages in "formal" livestock trade with 
a number of its neighbors and other countries.  
 
Numerous authors have struggled to define the situation in Somalia, and most revert to 
ambiguous "half-status" definitions. Bernard Helander argued in his 1997 article "Is 
there a civil society in Somalia?" that Somalia's state could be most accurately 
described as being in a state of "not war, not peace." According to Peter Little, the 
Somali economy can be roughly classified as "not official/not unofficial," a claim that 
he says has become increasingly applicable to other countries, particularly those in 
Africa, are seeing the informal economy driving most financial activity.  Somalia 
current situation may be most accurately described as an extreme case along the 
formal to informal range of economies.30
                                                 
30 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 8-9. 
  This notion of a "formal to informal 
continuum" has been more emphatically described as "legal to illegal" in certain other 
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venues, notably at the policy level.  Somalia should represent an entry along this 
evolution, certainly further along than any other story comparable in terms of state 
weakness or failure.  However, it should not be viewed as an individual case without 
this context, lest any potentially valuable insight from its study is attributed to the 
exceptional situation.  As Little poignantly states, Somalia represents a "question of 
degree, not difference" when compared to other weak or failing states contending with 
sub-regional conflict. 
 
After almost 20 years, it seems certain that the applicability of these ambiguous "half-
statuses" has shown that they are not rooted in a transitory phase.  Rather, they are 
probably the best that that one can put together when attempting to understand the 
situation in Somalia, particularly in terms of its economy and any subsequent 
discussions of development.  
 
 
2.4 The Hawalaad : Somalia's Informal Transfer System as a Theoretical 
Lynchpin? 
 
The disparate circles of theory presented previously mirror the inherent complexity of 
the different segments of Somali life.  Fortunately, a single component common to 
each is present, and in itself provides a vital cog in the analysis of the case- the 
Hawalaad informal transfer system.  While the next chapter will discuss the 
Hawalaad at length, with a particular focus on its appeal, functionality, and business 
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model, this segment aims to establish its place conceptually.  The Hawalaad is the 
primary conduit for money between diaspora and home, and makes almost exclusive 
use of modern telecommunications technology.  With intermittent and inconsistent 
international intervention, the bulk of Somali society had few alternatives other than 
rely on and in doing so contribute to the growing informal economy. This economy 
grew in a number of dimensions outside of financial transfers, branching out to 
include informal cross-border trading and smuggling. However, it is the Hawalaad 
system that has served as the glue keeping many facets of Somali society at home and 
abroad together, and facilitating a degree of financial wellbeing comparable to its 
neighbors. While the day-to-day operations and practical dimensions of the Hawalaad 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, I will take the opportunity here to outline 
its niche at the corner of the aforementioned theories. 
 
To establish a place theoretically for the Hawalaad, it is important to compare it to 
other, more formal remittance transfer systems.  Other informal transfer systems exist 
across the globe, such as the hundi, fei chien, phoe kuan, and other related services, 
including simple courier businesses.31
                                                 
31 El Qorchi, Mohammed, Samuel M. Maimbo, and John F. Wilson. "Informal Funds Transfer Systems: 
An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System ." The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. 
(2003): 18-20. 
  However, the Somali Hawalaad transcends all 
of these in terms of scope and efficiency of service as well as the degree to which it is 
culturally attune.  In addition to charging higher fees, these systems require 
substantially larger amounts of time, information, and access.  Each one of these 
factors is a major determinant for would-be users, and often represents the breaking 
point in transaction cost for these would-be users.  In recent years, IMF reports have 
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warned that remittance transaction costs are high, and that while economic adversity 
may affect this revenue stream less quickly, transaction costs will eventually prove to 
be a deterrent to sending money home.   
 
The Somali Hawalaad model is unique in that the it bypasses several financial 
transaction costs as well as almost every potential social cost, such as the substantial 
amounts of time spent filling in gratuitous paperwork or answering potentially 
uncomfortable questions at an international bank branches. The charge to send money 
via the Hawalaad system is around four or five percent over the whole amount to be 
transferred, a charge substantially lower than Western Union, perhaps the closest thing 
to a "formal" competitor to the Hawalaad. Perhaps the most succinct way to express 
the effectiveness of this system is to note that Western Union is not represented in 
Mogadishu.  The Hawalaad is comprised of individuals, networks, and organizations 
that employ a variety of informal methods of transferring both money and value.  It is 
this gray area that causes regulators the most concern because, for the most part, there 
appears to be a direct correlation between the degree of funds and goods commingling 
and the likelihood of criminal intent to conceal or deceive. 
 
The Hawalaad utilizes a widespread network of people not necessarily affiliated under 
the banner of business, but rather culture or ethnicity.  The transactions themselves can 
be accomplished by a couple of individuals on an irregular or regular basis.  The 
Hawalaad is not a rigid business conglomerate. It is more similar in business model to 
the franchisee-restaurant system of independently owned firms that are loosely 
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connected by the same store name and logo.  However, formal incorporated or 
franchised companies operate under similar auspices albeit by more rigidly 
conforming to national or international standards of business practice.  Hawalaad 
services today frequently allude to the same services found at formal financial 
institutions, but leave no trail for anyone wishing to monitor or reconstruct the 
transaction route.32
 
   
Each of the theoretical angles of analysis mentioned in this chapter are of utmost value 
when analyzing the Hawalaad system.  As the principal channel of diaspora funds 
back into Somalia, its importance in this study is unquestionable.  The subsequent 
chapter will continue to develop these concepts while outlining the practical intricacies 
of the Hawalaad system.  From that point, the Hawalaad role in facilitating diaspora-
driven development will be explored.  
                                                 
32 Maimbo, Samuel, and Nikos Passas. "The Regulation and Supervision of Informal Transfer 
Systems." In Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects, eds. Samuel Maimbo and Dilip 
Ratha, 211-226. Washington, DC, 2005. The World Bank. 214. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HAWALAAD SYSTEM 
 
The Hawalaad system serves as the primary conduit for diaspora remittances into 
Somalia, and is important to discuss in terms of each theoretical angle addressed in the 
previous chapter.  It embodies the murky political and economic boundaries in 
Somalia, and is both a creation of and instrument to the informal economic 
opportunities that have evolved in the country. While the Hawalaad system today 
provides the primary financial link between the diaspora and families in the home 
country through mediums of telecommunications technology, the system itself has a 
far deeper history, both globally and specific to Somali culture.  
 
This chapter will focus directly on the history, defining characteristics, and practical 
usage of the Hawalaad system within Somali society today.  While the Hawalaad has 
a long history stretching back for centuries, emphasis will be placed on the more 
contemporary periods of migration out of Somalia and the modern developments in 
terms of technological change.  
 
 
3.1 Definition of the Term 
 
The Hawalaad system has been in existence for centuries, with some early Arabic 
texts dating it as early as the 8th century CE.  The etymology of the term "Hawalaad" 
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originates with the classical Arabic word meaning to "change or transform." It was 
subsequently assimilated into both Urdu and Hindi, where the term is recognized as 
describing "trust" and "reference." Ironically, it is the Urdu and Hindi definition of the 
term that comes closest to encompassing the Hawalaad system utilized in Somalia today.  
It is an informal system of basic financial services that includes a worldwide network 
based solely on trust and cultural ties. The "Hawala" is an individual shop, and the 
"Hawaladar" is the person in charge of that business.  Additionally, there are a number of 
other, more peripheral actors involved in Somali business and thus involved in Hawalaad 
transactions. They will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
3.2 Informal Precursors and the Evolution of the Hawalaad 
 
Some have argued that the roots of the contemporary Hawalaad system can be traced 
back to the 1960s, when many Somali migrant-workers found their way to southern 
Africa to work on the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.1
                                                 
1 Omer, Abdusalam. A Report on Supporting Systems and Procedures for the Effective Regulation and 
Monitoring of Somali Remittance Companies (Hawala). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Development 
Programme in Somalia, 2002. 5. 
  However it was 
across the two decades following that the value, tangible and intangible, of the informal 
financial transfer system became most clearly evident. A large wave of Somali migrants 
made their way to the Arab Gulf States as employment opportunities were made available 
in the booming oil economy. This, in conjunction with harsher political repression at 
home, elevated the necessity for the diaspora-remittance lifeline, and the utility of such a 
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system grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s.2
 
  However, the precursors to today's 
Somali informal transfer system were much simpler and were unable to rely on time and 
space compression offered by modern communications technologies. 
This first-wave of migrants to the Arab Gulf states during the oil boom era initially made 
use of a remittance system known as the franco-valuta system.  In this system, migrant 
workers in the Gulf would purchase a quantity of high-value and high-demand goods, 
often electronic or household in nature, at duty-free prices in their host countries.  These 
goods would be shipped back to Somalia and sold for profit, with most of the profits 
going to relatives via the traders.  In some circumstances, a share of the money would go 
back to the original migrant worker himself. Many others simply remitted money or 
goods directly to relatives, often through the same traders.3  This system was pioneered 
by members of the Isaaq clan.4 This system was almost wholly reliant on clan lineages 
and a high degree of trust in the fellow clan members responsible for selling the imported 
goods. This served as a strengthening mechanism for ethnic ties. The franco-valuta 
system was also invaluable in serving both the needs of oft-marginalized families at 
home while simultaneously stimulating the consumer goods market and providing a 
much needed source of foreign exchange.5
                                                 
2 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." Global 
Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 4,5. 
  According to some reports, the franco-valuta 
system was responsible for between US$300 and US$350 million dollars in remitted 
3 Simons, Anna. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
126. 
4 Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." In The Migration-
Development Nexus, eds. Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Sorenson, 233-258. Geneva, Switzerland, 2003. 
The International Organization for Migration. 246. 
5 Jamal, Vali. "Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy." Development and Change, no. 19 
(1988): 203. 
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resources each year towards the end of the 1970s and throughout the first half of the 
1980s, with an upward trend.  The gross remittance total for 1987 was estimated to be 
between US$480 and US$540 million dollars.6  That estimated figure would represent 
almost 40 percent of Somalia's Gross National Product each year during that same period 
and equal to thirteen times the Somali-based national wage bill.7
 
 
Somalis abroad throughout the Gulf, Middle East, North Africa, and Western Europe 
found this avenue of remittances favorable both financially and politically; no paper trail 
on either end allowed relatives at home to receive money relatively anonymously and 
thus avoid drawing substantial attention to a remitting individual's family.  Additionally, 
migrants generally ended up residing close to fellow migrants who were members of the 
same clans, or at least members of peripheral clans that enjoyed good relations with other 
migrants' clans. This contributed to a further reinforcement of the "clan identity" as the 
dominant social coagulant.  
 
This period was also marked by increased attempts at market interference by the state-
controlled Somali Commercial Bank (SCB), the only formal financial institution in the 
country throughout the 1980s. The Somali Commercial Bank began imposing strict tariffs 
and duties on both formal and informal imports and exports, and tightening border 
controls became a major concern for workers abroad utilizing the franco-valuta system. 
The government, in what ultimately could be described as over-assertion of itself as the 
                                                 
6 Green, Reginald H., and Vali Jamal. Somalia: Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, Poverty, Pockets, Volatile 
Vulnerability and Public Pauperisation. Mogadishu, Somalia: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
1987. 
7 Marchal, Roland. Final Report on the Post Civil War Somali Business Class. Paris, France: European 
Commission, Somali Unit, 1996. 35. 
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financial authority in the state, created an environment where traders and merchants were 
essentially punished for engaging in formal financial activities.  Even when so-called 
legitimate economic activities were able to function, they did so at a much higher 
transaction cost as compared to the informal economic sector. 
 
In addition, the SCB exhibited all of the symptoms of a state-controlled institution in a 
sector that was growing increasingly reliant on new technologies.  SCB's formal banking 
offices were sparse in number and disproportionately distributed in the major urban 
centers. Telecommunications was inefficient and irregular; and hard postal services 
lagged even further behind the newer venues for commerce.  The bureaucracy continued 
to grow as the government sought out prospective tariff-payers in the informal finance 
sector, contributing to even more disincentive to utilize the formal channels of finance. 
Bureaucratic approval, always from Mogadishu, was needed for any sort of transaction, 
ranging from large-scale trading to small currency exchanges, leaving the population to 
make use of the alternatives if they wanted to get anything accomplished in a timely 
manner.   
 
The franco-valuta system was officially banned in 1982 ostensibly because it increased 
the misuse of much needed foreign exchange, but more likely because it potentially 
undermined the power of the regime's own patron-client mechanisms.8
                                                 
8 Marchal, Roland. Final Report on the Post Civil War Somali Business Class. Paris, France: European 
Commission, Somali Unit, 1996. 26. 
  Yet, the ban had 
little effect as it only led to a new system. Thus, the Hawalaad system evolved and 
gained prominence in order to fill the vacuum as the next iteration of Somalia's informal 
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transfer system.  While it did not involve a goods trader, it still provided a crucial source 
of hard currency exchange. The significance of these remittances grew as part of the 
emerging parallel economy in the 1980s, when they were estimated to be worth US$370 
million annually, of which 75 percent came from workers in the Gulf countries.9
 
  
This dynamic of increasing reliance on informal economic avenues and a de-emphasis on 
the role of the state in such matters clearly foreshadowed the collapse of the state a few 
years later.  With Somalia's formal economic institutions sputtering, faltering, and failing 
towards the end of the 1980s, the subsequent collapse of the system with the government 
actually meant very little to the bulk of Somalia's population in terms of financial 
services.10  The collapse of the state and the subsequent outbreak of violence was the 
biggest catalyst for the growth of the Somali diaspora in the West.  It is these more recent 
Somalia diaspora groups residing in Dubai and Western states that are playing the role of 
the largest source of remittances to family members in Somalia or in refugee camps in 
neighboring countries. This period of migration to Western countries following the 
outbreak of violence is almost directly correlated to the period of rapid technological 
change that began in the early to mid-1990s.  The war and subsequent dissolution of the 
state served to sharply catalyze the rise of the informal economic system. Increased 
migration led to increased demand for remittance avenues, and enterprising businessmen 
were able to take advantage of this market deficiency.11
                                                 
9 Bradbury, Mark, Kenneth Menkhaus, and Roland Marchal. Human Development Report Somalia 2001. 
Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Development Program, 2001. 
  
10 Simons, Anna. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
134. 
11 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International Africa 
Institute, 2008. 147. 
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3.3 Technological Change and the Hawalaad 
 
During the pre-telecommunications age, the Hawalaad system utilized camels and pack 
animals to exchange messages and distribute funds. The system began using postal 
services as they became available in the late 1800s, and has experienced considerable 
growth with the advent of modern telecommunications, including email, text messaging, 
and voice-over internet technologies. Somalis are also increasingly making use of internet 
forums and message boards not only as mediums of low-level communication, but for 
exchange of ideas in terms of business and trading endeavors.  
 
While the history of the Somali Hawalaad system spreads back for centuries, it is only in 
the past 20 years or so that it has risen to its current prominence in daily life.  This rise is 
directly correlated with the spread of globalization and the increased rate of technological 
change, particularly in the field of telecommunications.  While the existence of 
substantially-sized communities of Somali migrants in Britain during the colonial period 
may have been the first to make use of the Hawalaad system in conjunction with 
telecommunications technologies,12
                                                 
12 Harris, Hermoine. The Somali community in the UK: What we know and how we know it. London, UK: 
Information Centre About Asylum and Refugees in the UK, 2004. 22. 
 it was in the African continent that the prefigures of 
the Hawalaad's current manifestation began to appear. The Hawalaad system evolved 
during the 1980s and into the 1990s, when other modes of transfer were being shut down 
and where money was frequently transferred to the armed guerillas who eventually 
overthrew the Siad Barre regime.  Thus, to increase the efficiency of the Hawalaad, the 
Dahab Shiil Company then based in the Ethiopian town of Dire Dawa found that mobile 
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radio systems used by the opposition movements combined with satellite 
telecommunications facilities were very useful.13  The seeds planted during the onset of 
conflict actually later funneled in technology and lead to the spread of efficient 
telecommunications companies in post-collapse Somalia. The utility of these 
technologies quickly manifested itself in all manner of informal economic practice.14
 
  
Innovation and entrepreneurial savvy was rewarded in its own way, as was demonstrated 
by the Dahab Shiil Hawalaad company's ascension to the top of its sector in Somaliland. 
Today, the practical use of sending home a sum of remittance money operates much like 
a wire transfer at a formal banking institution; the client brings the money to his or her 
local Hawala establishment and provides information about the intended recipient as well 
as a specific pick-up location. The client pays a small fee, and the Hawaladar transfers 
this information via email, telephone, or fax to the receiving Hawala operator. The 
targeted recipient may then arrive at the specified Hawala and provide whatever 
identifying information had been specified by the sender. This information can be as 
simple as a given name, but can include anything from five-digit passwords to complex 
information about one's lineage and, in the case of Somalis, ethnic or clan affiliations.  
Somalis both abroad and at home make use of the extreme compression of time and space 
offered by telecommunications technologies.  As shown in Figure 1, the Hawalaad 
                                                 
13 Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." In The Migration-
Development Nexus, eds. Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Sorenson, 233-258. Geneva, Switzerland, 2003. 
The International Organization for Migration. 246. 
14 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 3. 
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system today is wholly reliant on telecommunications lines between both the remitter and 
the remittance receiver, as well as their corresponding Hawaladars: 
FIGURE 2. Typical Somali Hawalaad  Transaction Model 
 
While this type of model, originated by El-Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson in 2002, is 
largely simplified, it still provides a workable overview of how the system works.15  Most 
Hawalaad transactions, particularly those directed to more rural regions in Somalia, 
might make use of several more Hawaladars in series before the remittance receiver is 
able to pick up the money.16
 
   
 
                                                 
15 El Qorchi, Mohammed, Samuel M. Maimbo, and John F. Wilson. "Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An 
Analysis of the Informal Hawala System ." The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. (2003): 
1-71. 
16 Ballard, Roger. "Hawala Transformed: Remittance-driven Transnational Networks in the post-Imperial 
economic order." University of Manchester Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, Conference paper. 
(2004): 9. 
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3.4 Attributes and Advantages of the Hawalaad 
 
The Hawalaad network itself is extremely fluid and relatively devoid of any deep-rooted 
institutions. All but the largest Hawalaad companies refrain from establishing a central 
office or headquarters, and usually settle past debts and balances from past transactions in 
relatively informal settings such as homes or even, in smaller instances, at public cafes or 
gathering places. There are, however, a number of qualifiers and attributes specific to the 
Hawalaad system. 
 
Most Hawalas operate between specific areas of the world, of through specific country-
to-country channels, similar to airlines. For example, an individual in Montreal, Canada 
wanting to send money to Jirriban, Somalia may end up using the services of one 
Hawaladar to send the money from Canada to say Mogadishu, Somalia, but another 
Hawaladar to move the money from Mogadishu to Jirriban.17
                                                 
17 Shay, Shaul. Somalia: Between Jihad and Restoration. Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
2008. 73. 
  However, like the 
economic context they operate within, the nature of association between various 
Hawaladars is not "formal" by any Western understanding of the word.  Despite the lack 
of any sort of legal agreements or binding contracts, Hawaladars are culturally 
compelled to uphold honesty and maintain standard operating norms.  Hawaladars are 
generally networked into the system through a family tie, then expand out and build 
relations initially with other operators known in their familial network.  As time goes on, 
more established Hawaladars may seek to increase business by expanding the networks, 
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sending general inquiry emails or making phone calls to Hawaladars that they have heard 
of, dealt with indirectly, or are recommended to them by other operators. 
 
In addition, Hawaladars rarely maintain any sort of customer or transaction records, 
particularly once one is dealing with a Hawala in-country. This practice of anonymous 
transactions has evolved considerably for Hawaladars operating in the West, particularly 
after the events of September 11 sparked the US-government's shutdown of Al Barakat, 
one of Somalia's most prevalent remittance firms.  Today, if records are maintained, they 
are often handwritten, on pieces of scrap paper in what has been described as 
"idiosyncratic shorthand"18  and are usually disposed of immediately after the transaction 
is complete. It has been suggested that some Hawaladars might maintain their own 
records for certain remittance-receiving customers, either on their own accord or perhaps 
at the request of a separate client, but this is a practice that is never advertised and rarely 
admitted to.19
 
 
There are a number of key reasons that the Hawalaad system has evolved to become the 
base of financial activity in Somalia. In a paper on informal financial transfer services in 
2003, the IMF identified five characteristics specific to an informal financial transfer 
system. These included; speed, cost, cultural convenience, versatility, and anonymity.20
                                                 
18 Shay, Saul. Somalia: Between Jihad and Restoration. Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
2008. 54. 
  
19 United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on 
International Trade and Finance. (2001). Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance. 107th Congress, 1st sess., 14 
November 2001. Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 2002. 24. 
20 El Qorchi, Mohammed, Samuel M. Maimbo, and John F. Wilson. "Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An 
Analysis of the Informal Hawala System ." The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. (2003): 
15-17. 
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While these five categories frequently overlap, Speed and Cost could roughly be lumped 
into economic cost benefits, and Cultural Convenience, Versatility, and Anonymity could 
be described as transaction-cost oriented benefits.  The following section will analyze 
those stated benefits within the context of Somalia and Somali diaspora relations through 
the Hawalaad alone.  
 
3.4.1 Speed and Compression of Time and Space:  According to Somalis that regularly 
make use of the Hawalaad system, a financial transfer utilizing one well-established 
information route can take less than an hour to be received by the recipient. With the high 
speed of telecommunications technology available on both ends of the transaction, the 
most common delays relate to constants such as differing schedules owed to different 
time zones.  Even then, however, there are generally Hawaladar institutions that are open 
24 hours or extended (18) hours each day in most major Somali population hubs, notably 
Mogadishu, Hargeysa, and Dubai.21  However, many adhere to whatever the normal 
business hours in the host country of operation tends to be. However, most urgent 
transactions can generally be made "express" for an extra fee.  "Express" or similarly 
named service upgrades might entail a Hawaladar receiving a call or email while he is at 
home or "out of the office," then subsequently phoning or SMSing the corresponding 
recipient Hawaladar at home, incurring international calling expenses.22
                                                 
21 El Qorchi, Mohammed, Samuel M. Maimbo, and John F. Wilson. "Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An 
Analysis of the Informal Hawala System ." The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. (2003): 
12. 
  The original 
remitter is responsible for these charges and any service charges incurred by either or 
both of the Hawaladars.   
22 Paradkar, Shalaka. "Hope is Forever: Somalis in Dubai." Gulf News Art & Culture Section's Friday 
Magazine. 18 May 2006. http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/05/18/10040858.html. 
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As communications technology has gotten more reliable and more prevalent, the time 
needed to conduct a Hawalaad-based transfer has dropped substantially.  Earlier in the 
system's evolution, transactions between Western countries and Somalia would take an 
average of 24-48 hours or even more, owing to regular connection failures and depending 
on geographic impediments that might need to be overcome.  Remittances utilizing 
multiple Hawaladars or remittances traveling along previously unused transaction routes 
may take longer, up to two or three days in most cases. This is also the case when 
remittances are sent to Somalia's rural areas, particularly border regions.  
 
Payments today are generally sent via e-mail, although depending on distance, cost, and 
familiarity, Hawaladars may use faxes, SMS messaging, or regular phone calls to 
communicate with each other. This represents a stark contrast when compared to the 
earliest manifestations of the Somali Hawalaad system, which relied on hand-written 
notes, word of mouth, and a much higher level of implicit trust in each component of a 
longer chain of communication. 
 
3.4.2 Monetary Cost Advantages: The IMF argued that the cost benefit for remitters 
utilizing informal transfer systems was primarily rooted in the financial differences; 
notably that informal systems are inherently less expensive than transactions involving 
banks and other formal institutions. However, in the Somali case this is a moot point for 
two reasons.  First, there is simply not a realistic alternative to the Hawalaad when it 
comes to getting money into Somalia.  Second, the cost itself is largely dictated by a 
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market that itself is rooted in notions of cultural loyalty, and is more affordable than any 
comparable formal system, even though those are not even actually available.   
 
Traditional rates for an international transfer of funds through a formal transfer service 
such as Western Union are much higher than comparable Hawalaad rates.  Remittance 
senders in Europe and North America can expect to pay a five to nine percent fee for 
transfers over US$500 dollars to African or Middle Eastern countries.  For example, a 
US$1000 dollar transfer originating in North America and destined for a Horn of Africa 
country, such as Djibouti, would incur a minimum US$65 dollar service charge, while 
sending US$1000 to Sudan from the United States via Western Union's telephone service 
would cost US$85 dollars.23
 
   
In contrast, the IMF states that the cost of an informal transfer between two major 
international centers averages between two and five percent of the total amount sent.  The 
"official" line from Hawaladars operating into and out of Somalia is that the charge is a 
blanket rate of five percent.  However, discounts can be negotiated through a myriad of 
avenues including discounts for extenuating familial circumstances, reduced fees for 
abnormally large transfers, reduced tariffs on the basis of frequent business, and so on. If 
the relationship between the remitter and Hawaladars utilized in the transfer is well 
established, costs may go down and transaction time will also drop. The ultimate price is 
determined by the size of the transaction, the ultimate destination of the funds, the 
distances crossed and mutual familiarity of the Hawalaad networks employed, and 
                                                 
23 All figures and quotes taken from Western Union's Online Price Shopper Utility: 
https://wumt.westernunion.com/WUCOMWEB/priceShopperRedirectAction.do?method=load 
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relationship between the remitter and the Hawaladar. Bargaining and discounts are 
commonplace, and rarely does a regular Somali remitter walk into a Hawaladar 
storefront without any means of negotiating at the very least a nominal discount.  
 
The Hawaladars are able to keep their costs low for a number of reasons.  The system 
itself relies on very little infrastructure or overhead.  The infrastructure required by a 
Hawaladar is nil when compared to a formal banking institution.  Hawaladars can 
operate from home, from a friend's home, from a small shop, or even a nook or cranny in 
an already existing shop or store.  Many Hawaladars operate almost on a contract basis 
with pre-existing exchange bureaus, smalltime brokers, telephone or computer centrals, 
or travel agencies.  A Hawaladar can make due with a simple telephone, although most 
today operate with desktop or laptop computers.  For a period in the mid-to-late 1990s, 
fax machines were extremely prevalent method of transferring information, but today it is 
clear that computers have taken over. Emails, instant messaging, and voice-over internet 
phone usage are the most common methods of communication between Hawaladars.  
 
The system relies on very little infrastructure or overhead, and it is able to bypass any 
regulation or taxation for at least half, if not all, of the money's journey.  Virtually no 
record-keeping or administrative work is required, as little attention is paid to formal 
accounting procedures, regulation laws, or taxation practices.24
                                                 
24 Simons, Anna. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
134. 
  Major remitting nations 
such as the USA have over the years implemented laws and regulations requiring 
Hawaladars to adhere to certain common business practices, including knowing your 
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clients and keeping documentation and transaction archives. Taxes have factored into this 
regulation as well.  However, remittances are virtually completely free of interference, 
regulation, or taxation once that Hawaladar's text message, fax, or phone call reaches 
Somalia. 
 
The minimal operating costs of Hawalaad shops also correlates to their high prevalence 
in Somali migrant hubs, compared not only to the formal financial sector but even when 
compared to other small scale business endeavors common to migrants in host countries, 
such as small grocer shops, textile shops, or carpet stores.  This in turn foments an 
extremely effective system of competition and price equalizing. Because of these factors, 
it can be concretely demonstrated that remitting through the Hawalaad network is less 
expensive, in financial terms alone, than using the formal banking sector for money 
transfers.  
 
3.4.3 The Notion of Cultural Convenience: Unlike the prior segment on the purely 
economical advantages of the Hawalaad system, benefits such as cultural convenience 
are purely based on more qualitatively-oriented transaction costs beyond the financial 
dimension. For diaspora communities, the Hawaladar is a vital part of the Somali culture 
abroad.  A trip to the Hawaladar simultaneously offers a mechanism to uphold cultural 
norms, i.e. supporting a less well-off relative in the homeland, while simultaneously 
speaking the native language and bantering with another individual who is culturally in 
tune with the customer. This is a naturally-reinforcing mechanism that usually only 
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solidifies the remitter-hawaladar relationship starting from the first meeting or first 
transaction. 
 
In areas where the less well-off Somali diaspora populations exist, such as the Somali 
refugee communities in Nairobi, a Hawaladar transaction is appealing due to illiteracy or 
limited education levels in conjunction with the aforementioned degree of cultural trust.  
While illiteracy among Somalis in Western nations is not as significant, the idea of 
bypassing endless paperwork, formal bank bureaucracy, and avoiding a direct 
information trail certainly constitute some of the main appeals to Somali businessmen 
abroad looking to remit funds. 
 
Hawaladars know the societal norms, a particularly important component in remitting to 
more conservative areas of Somalia.  From a gender standpoint, women are still required 
to have minimal exposure to the world beyond their home and village, and clearly cannot 
establish relationships with outside institutions, financial or otherwise. The Hawaladar, 
as a part of the community, is seen as a bridge to this potentially crippling gap in most 
situations.  It is these cultural dynamics of the informal system that make it continually 
self-reinforcing.   
 
3.4.4 Versatility and Utility: While each of the aforementioned components of the Somali 
Hawalaad system could be described as "versatile," the term in this case is meant to 
describe the "bigger picture" benefits of the Hawalaad, notably in the years immediately 
following the fall of Barre and in giving rise to the informal economy.  Informal 
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transactions have been described as highly adaptable to conditions of wars, civil unrest, 
conflicts, economic crisis, weak or nonexistent banking systems, as well as economic 
sanctions and blockades in recent publications by the IMF.  This represents a virtual 
laundry list of some of the most serious problems facing Somalia today. 
 
This has been evidenced in cases outside of Somalia, including Afghanistan and to a 
lesser extent, Iraq. Similar conditions exist in each venue in which an informal economy 
appears; a nonexistent or nonfunctional financial system, years of conflict, destabilized or 
nonexistent politics or governance, and a diaspora willing to remit much-needed money. 
Additionally, the amount of resources necessary to ensure security on-site, much less in 
the vicinity, of a formal financial institution would drive costs even further out of reason. 
 
Banks, as an institution, are traditionally poorly suited to remittance transferring and 
distribution. A model involving transfers between major urban centers is certainly 
feasible, and has been executed rather successfully by Western Union in certain regions, 
notably Central America.  While remittances traditionally originate from bank-friendly 
environments like large urban centers with concentrated populations, the destinations are 
rarely as easily discerned or convenient.  Banks cannot profitably open branches in 
sparsely populated regions, nor can they move to and with their customers. Formal 
financial institutions today operate at a level far above the remote village and cannot 
afford to pay attention to sub-regional disputes and conflicts.  An informal system such as 
the Hawalaad becomes requisite when the security situation in conjunction with the wide 
dispersion of remittance recipients is taken into consideration. 
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The Hawalaad can adapt to each remitter and each recipient on a personal basis, and 
handle foreign exchange in-house.  This versatility allows Hawaladars to adapt to the 
needs of their customers, including minimizing regulation, taxation, and any sort of 
identifying paper trail, as discussed in the Anonymity segment of this chapter.  
Additionally, due to the rapid transmission of remittances, the Hawalaad is far more 
suited to coping with weak or unstable local currencies than a formal banking institution 
and its accompanying bureaucracy and analytical business sectors.   
 
3.4.5 Anonymity and Confidentiality: Coincidentally, the anonymity factor involved 
with Hawalaad transactions alternately encourages remitting and scrutiny from the 
governments hosting migrants. This is particularly true in a post September 11 era, in 
which all substantial financial transactions occurring "below the radar" of the formal 
financial sectors are immediately suspect. 
 
Hawaladars rarely if ever keep any formal records of their customers or their transaction 
histories, and if they do have information it is completely unavailable to regulatory 
bodies or third parties in general. There are no documents required to do business with a 
Hawaladar, and there is no need to "open an account" or in any way establish an identity. 
For a long period of time, this was true in every country and region that Hawaladars 
operated in.  However, after the shut down of Al Barakat following allegations that it was 
anonymously funneling money towards extremist groups, many Hawaladars in the US 
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and some in Europe have adopted some basic record-keeping and identity-verifying 
procedures.  
 
Recipient information, however, is still virtually nonexistent. The one piece of 
transmitted information is the "code," from the sender to the recipient.  However, this 
code is often predetermined, based on clan lineage and knowledge which does not 
change, therefore precluding the necessity of the transfer of even that single bit of 
information.  Usually, the only evidence of the transaction is the settlement 
documentation between Hawaladars only. This rarely includes details outside of total 
amounts of money owed, and possibly dates and times of the transactions. Customer 
information is not maintained, and attempts to conduct primary research on what little of 
this data exists have proven notoriously difficult.25
 
  
 
3.5 Who Remits? General Statistics 
 
Assembling comprehensive statistics on Hawalaad clientele and ascertaining remittance 
trends is a complex, if not impossible endeavor.  However, despite the lack of record-
keeping or administrative capacity, the Dahabshiil remittance firm has conducted some 
basic surveys about remitter demographics.  In 2004, the company revealed that an 
internal survey indicated that remittance sending divided by gender was almost exactly 
                                                 
25 Ballard, Roger. "Hawala Transformed: Remittance-driven Transnational Networks in the post-Imperial 
economic order." University of Manchester Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, Conference paper. 
(2004): 4. 
 58 
even, with men remitting around 53 percent and women remitting the other 47, despite 
some limited evidence indicating that diaspora women may work more hours and spend 
less on themselves.26  According to the same survey, people at the working age between 
30 and 50 years old were overwhelmingly the most likely to remit funds, with 56 percent 
of all remittances coming from that age group.  People under 30 years old and over 50 
each accounted for slightly over 20 percent of the remitter population.27  Dahabshiil has 
also released some basic figures concerning average remittance amounts sent per 
transaction.  While these figures are limited, they provide insight into the lifeline/familial 
support dimension of remittances while simultaneously illuminating some of the larger-
scale, investment oriented remittance sending through deduction.  Most notably, 90 
percent of Hawalaad transactions are valued at less than US$200 dollars at a time, and 
the mode transaction is US$100 dollars.28
 
  Dahabshiil's omission of the upper echelon of 
Hawalaad transaction totals in the results released indicates that the gradual upward trend 
of money sent spikes substantially for that ten percent segment of the remitting 
population.  Larger sums sent for investment, business, trade, and housing purchases 
clearly dwarf US$200 dollars, and most likely represent a much larger piece of the gross 
remittance pie. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 10-11. 
27 Shire, Saad. "Somali Remittance Companies and their Clients" in "Remittances and Economic 
Development in Somalia: An Overview." Ed Maimbo, Samuel.  The World Bank Social Development 
Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction, no. 38 (2006): 25. 
28 Ibid., 26. 
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FIGURES 3 and 4. Remittance Senders by Gender and Age 
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This chapter has served to outline why the Hawalaad system has been able to function 
and flourish from both a practical and a social standpoint.  In the absence of an effective 
government and formal financial sector, the Hawalaad system instead capitalized and 
developed on pre-existing social linkages, initially to meet basic needs and later, as will 
be discussed in later sections, facilitating diaspora commercial endeavors.  The combined 
allures of its monetary and cultural advantages have made it a pillar institution for Somali 
diaspora communities.  In order to adequately flesh out this notion, the following chapter 
will be dedicated to surveying three of the most significant Somali diaspora hubs; Dubai, 
London, and Minneapolis. 
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CHAPTER 4: MAJOR DIASPORA HUBS: A CONCISE OVERVIEW 
 
While this paper is primarily focused on development within Somalia and how 
diaspora initiatives arrive and manifest themselves on the ground, it is also important 
to briefly address the points of origin for these unique development endeavors.  In the 
years following the collapse of the state, remittances from the Somali diaspora 
working abroad have accounted for the largest segment of domestic economic value. 
The remittance sector is remains the leading source of private funds in Somalia today. 
Somalis remit approximately US$700 million to US$1 billion annually from more 
than 40 countries,1 possibly representing nearly 20 percent of Somalia's estimated 
gross US$5.5 billion domestic product.2
 
  
This chapter will succinctly outline three of the largest and most influential Somali 
diaspora hubs; Dubai, London, and Minneapolis.  Because statistics and data on 
Somali populations abroad are notoriously difficult to procure or accurately estimate, 
the subsequent city profiles will instead focus on painting a broader picture of how 
these diaspora communities are structured and how their members stay involved with 
both commercial and societal affairs at home.   
 
 
                                                 
1 United Nations Development Program, Analysis of the Macro-Economic Situation in South and 
Central Somalia. June 2004. Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD) (2004): 45. 
2 "Somalia," CIA World Factbook, available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/so.html. Accessed on 13 April 2009. 
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4.1 Dubai, United Arab Emirates: 
 
Having received some of the original waves of Somali migrants during the oil boom 
era of the 1970s, Dubai has developed into the largest hub for Somali business in the 
world.  Today, Somalis are both the largest and the oldest African expatriate 
community in Dubai.3
 
  Virtually all of Somalia's larger, more successful private 
companies are headquarted in Dubai, including Somali airlines and 
telecommunications firms.  Hawaladars operating in Dubai are frequently used as a 
mid-way point between Hawaladars in Western countries and Hawaladars in some of 
the more rural regions of Somalia. 
The commercial epicenter of the Somali diaspora in the UAE can be found in the Al 
Ras district of Deira, Dubai. The area is known on the streets as "Gold Oasis," and is 
comprised of countless storefronts, radiant, glimmering, and all similarly named. The 
area is now referred to as "Souq Es-Somal" in Arabic, or "The Somali Souq."  It is a 
swathe of jewelry shops selling everything from ethnic African jewelry decorated in 
rare gems to more modern necklaces that appear more akin to some type of body 
armor than a jeweler's design.  All of it is Somali-owned and Somali-operated, and 
Somalis have virtually monopolized the West African jewelry market in Dubai.4
                                                 
3 Dickinson, Daniel. "Somalis Cash in on Dubai Boom." BBC News.  2005. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4535642.stm. Internet; accessed 18 January 2009. 
  
Customers from Mali, Ghana, and Senegal flow in and out of the shops by the 
hundreds each day. East Africans also comprise a huge percentage of customers.  
4 Paradkar, Shalaka. "Hope is Forever: Somalis in Dubai." Gulf News Art & Culture Section's Friday 
Magazine. 18 May 2006. http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/05/18/10040858.html. 
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While Somalis have been in this neighborhood for decades, the first Somali woman to 
set up shop in this particular part of the world entered in 1997 from Toronto, Canada, 
another hub for the Somali diaspora.  Somalis also operate around a dozen busy textile 
and clothing shops in the Al Ras district. 
 
Under sponsorship of the United Nations Development Program in Somalia, the 
Somalia Business Council was formed in Dubai in 2005.5
 
  Among the slew of Somali-
owned and run businesses are a pair of private Somali airlines are headquartered in 
Dubai, including Star Africa Airways and Jubba Airways.  Additionally, the popular 
Djibouti-founded Daallo Airlines is also headquartered in Dubai, and offers numerous 
services to Somalia and Somaliland.  Somalia's aforementioned outstanding 
telecommunications service providers are also largely based and headquartered in 
Dubai.  At least one Hawalaad branch is found on every street, next to Somali 
restaurants, hotels, internet cafes, and printing shops. The Somali Business Council in 
Dubai now formally consists of over 200 companies.  Important to note in the vein of 
the formal to informal distinction in Somalia is that "informal" members of the council 
may double or even triple that membership figure.  The Somalia Business Council in 
Dubai wields a surprising amount of power within Somali itself, somewhat mirroring 
services and administrative tasks that would normally have been under the umbrella of 
a central government.   
 
                                                 
5 United Nations Development Program, Somali business community to create Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. Press Release, September 2005. 
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However, as the Chairman of the Council Sharif Ahmad Ba'alawi stated in 2006,  
"Somalia has not had any effective government for almost 2 decades now, no 
banks, and no state-security. This is why Somali businesses are run from 
Dubai, and to a lesser extent, Nairobi...  To you as an outsider, the situation 
seems terrible- your opinion is based on what you see on television or what 
you read in the newspapers.  But to us, it's really not that bad.  We know the 
people we are dealing with and are familiar with the culture of the place.  It 
would probably be more risky for me to do business in another African 
country. "6
 
 
Ba'alawi was raised in Mogadishu, but left for Dubai when the government collapsed 
and war broke out. He has spent his time in Dubai since, but managed to acquire a 
Yemeni passport in the process.  He has invested heavily in Somali territory, dealing 
with companies that export rice, sugar, cement, and other key goods into Somalia.  
 
Additionally, a large number of Somali firms that operate on the ground in Somalia 
are headquartered in Dubai.  These companies make use of the Emirates' formal 
banking systems as well as far simpler access, in terms of legality and recognition, to 
international markets.  One of the largest and most successful companies operating in 
Somalia, the Somali Telecom Group, is headquartered in a high rise above Nasr 
Square in Dubai.  The Somali Telecom Group will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Five.   
 
Business for Somalis in Dubai is generally good.  As mentioned before, many 
storefronts, ranging from jewelry and clothing to net cafes and Hawalaad 
establishments, are Somali enterprises in Dubai. These businesses can cater to any and 
                                                 
6 Paradkar, Shalaka. "Hope is Forever: Somalis in Dubai." Gulf News Art & Culture Section's Friday 
Magazine. 18 May 2006. http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/05/18/10040858.html. 
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every interested customer, but Dubai's Somali community largely provides its own 
commercial backbone.  Additionally, there are jobs in the service sector for those 
migrants with less education.  Somalis with higher degrees of education and more 
language proficiency often work as professors or teachers in schools in the Emirates.   
 
 
4.2 London, United Kingdom: 
 
As one of the longest-standing bastions of the Somali diaspora, London provides a 
solid example of a diaspora community with strong cultural and financial ties to home.  
While Somalis have been a presence in the city for decades, migration to London 
greatly accelerated in the decade following the collapse of government in their home 
state.  Estimates in 1994 indicated somewhere around 25,000 Somalis were residing in 
London.7  By 2003, estimate figures had almost quadrupled, indicating that around 
95,000 Somalis were residing in the greater London area.8
                                                 
7 Berns-McGown, Rima . Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London and Toronto. 
London, UK: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 240. 
  While Somali diaspora 
population statistics are notoriously difficult to measure accurately due to a host of 
complex issues including convoluted systems for assigning asylum and refugee status, 
underreporting on behalf of Somali families for fear of attracting attention to their 
households, and questions on generational issues concerning Somalis born in the 
United Kingdom, they do provide some insight into the size and scope of London's 
Somali diaspora. 
8 Holman, Christine and Naomi Holman. First Steps in a New Country: Baseline Indicators for the 
Somali Community in LB Hackney. London, UK: Sahil Housing Association. 2003. 6. 
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The districts of Wembley to the north and Tower Hamlets in the east have become the 
de facto Somali enclaves in London, with a large number of Hawalaad offices as well 
as Somali-run restaurants and shops dotting commercial areas.  A typical square in 
Wembley shows the facades of four Hawalaad storefronts, with two of those offices 
doubling as internet cafes or call centers. These dual-use facilities allow a remitter to 
immediately convey any codes or identifying information to their recipients, a handy 
feature on which many Somalis are reliant.   
 
Despite the belief that Somalis fare poorly in terms of salary and job security when 
compared to London's other migrant populations, they have been able to maintain 
steady remittances home.  Unlike in Dubai or even Minneapolis, the professional 
experiences and skills in the Somali diaspora are categorized as "underutilized" in 
London.  Former doctors, professors, or engineers are often found working as taxi 
drivers or are unemployed.9
 
  However, Hawaladars are prevalent in the city's heavily 
Somali-populated quarters, and general indicators show that remittance flows back to 
Somalia are growing. 
One prototypical Hawalaad company in London is the Xawaaladda Red Sea, also 
known as the Red Sea Express. According to owner/manager Adam Ismail Hassan, 
well over 200 Somalis use his firm to remit money everyday, and that the average 
                                                 
9 Harris, Hermoine. The Somali community in the UK: What we know and how we know it. London, 
UK: Information Cenre About Asylum and Refugees in the UK, 2004. 38. 
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transaction is around US$200. Mr. Hassan stated that most remitters rely on the 
clan/sub-clan means of identification. Mr. Hassan equated the different layers of the 
traditional clan identification system to ascertaining an exact address; the clan is the 
region, while the sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, and so on further narrow down to the 
equivalents of towns, streets, and addresses.  Also according to Mr. Hassan, even 
Somalis residing in London on welfare benefits generally are able to send some sum 
of money back home10
 
.   
In efforts to compromise with various financial regulations coming into play following 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Xawaaladda Red Sea implemented a number of 
additional identification and record-keeping procedures, beginning in 2003. Customers 
wishing to remit more than US$3,000 via his firm are required to produce a photo-ID 
card as well as fill out a single form with their name, address, and telephone number.  
While these "regulations" on behalf of Mr. Hassan and Xawaaladda Red Sea certainly 
will not catch all insalubrious informal economic activity, it is providing a start.  There 
is also indication that the host government is willing to compromise and work with the 
informal transfer system as well; Mr. Hassan displays an official inspection certificate 
on his wall affirming his shop's compliance with British money laundering laws. 
 
Social integration has been more difficult for Somalis in London than some of other 
major diaspora hubs across the globe.  London schools rarely have any Somali-
speaking staff on hand, inhibiting the education of subsequent generations of Somalis 
                                                 
10 Winter, Joseph. "Telecoms thriving in lawless Somalia" BBC News.  19 November 2004. Available 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm. Internet; accessed 20 February 2009. 
 66 
in the UK.  Somalis in London have also increasingly been recognized for their 
contributions in creative industries, with Somali authors such as Shafi Sayed and 
Zahrah Awaleh gaining popularity in UK literary circles.  This subtle integration of 
British and Somali cultures can also be seen at the neighborhood level, with the Tower 
Hamlets neighborhood celebrating "Somali Week" in mid-June each year.11
 
   
 
4.3 Minneapolis and St. Paul Minnesota, United States 
 
The state of Minnesota is one of the most popular destinations for Somalis 
immigrating to the United States.  Somalis arrived mainly in the mid 1990s, during the 
fallout from the collapse of government in their home country.  In 1994 and 1995, 
larger groups of Somalis began being officially resettled to Minneapolis as refugees.12  
But the large majority of Somalis currently residing in Minneapolis, at least sixty 
percent, came from other states.13
 
  The establishment of a substantial community of 
Somalis in the cities amplified Somali migration flow to that area; whether relocated 
as refugees in the early 1990s or emigrating for more economic reasons, the twin cities 
of Minneapolis and St. Paul have become a large hub for Somalis in America.   
                                                 
11 Saini, Angela. "Young, Somali, and Proud." BBC News.  11 June 2006. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2006/10/30/young_somalis_feature.shtml. Internet; 
accessed 14 March 2009. 
12 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 9. 
13 Mattessich, Paul. Speaking for Themselves: A Survey of Hispanic, Hmong, Russian, and Somali 
Immigrants in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Saint Paul, MN: Wilder Research Center, 2000. 7. 
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The total number of officially resettled Somalis is estimated at approximately 6,000. 
Some recent studies have indicated that the Minneapolis metropolitan region plays 
host to the largest number of Somalis in the US. The US also has substantial 
populations of Somali migrants in San Diego, Portland Maine, Phoenix, and 
Columbus Ohio.  However, the problem mentioned concerning accurate statistics is 
illustrated in the Minneapolis case; there are no precise figures available and those that 
exist are clearly off the mark. Data from the US Census in 2000 indicated that around 
11,000 Somalis live in Minnesota, constituting approximately 0.2 percent of the state's 
total population14
 
.  
It has been strongly suggested that the figures from the federal census greatly 
underestimate the actual number of Somalis residing in the region.  This is because 
many extended Somali families reside in single homes, exceeding residential code 
limits. Because of these living situations, they often underreport their numbers. Public 
school enrollment statistics taken in 2000 actually suggest that anywhere between 
15,000 and 30,000 Somalis lived in Minnesota, and that this number was still 
growing.15
 
  
In addition to the fact that thousands of Somali refugees were formally relocated to 
Minnesota by the United States government in the mid 1990s, Minneapolis and St. 
Paul have also interestingly enough become a popular destination for Somali diaspora 
                                                 
14 United States Census Bureau. United States Census 2000, American Factfinder, Quick Tables: P13 
Ancestry. Available from www.census.gov. Internet; accessed on March 15, 2009. 
15 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 9. 
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relocation within the United States and Canada. The cities have a number of attributes 
that have made it attractive to Somali migrants.  Minnesota's economy has generally 
been strong and always varied with low unemployment rates.  There are a number of 
assembly plants and meat factories in the area that often allow employees to work 
overtime.  Less educated Somalis also often work as security guards, tax drivers, or 
dry cleaners.16
 
  American factories in these towns with large percentages of Somalis 
even provide facilities like Somali translators and bi-lingual notices, thus enabling 
non-English speakers to work there without difficulties.   
There are also a number of employment niches that more educated Somalis have been 
able to fill, and Minneapolis is home to a number of Somali lawyers, doctors, 
professors, and other high-skill, high-education requisite jobs.17  Regardless of the 
widely varying degrees of financial success and stability among the Twin Cities' 
Somali populations, almost all are able remit some money.  A study carried out in 
2000 estimated that around US$7 million dollars was remitted out of Minnesota each 
month with an upward trend.18
 
 
The second reason is tied to the fact that Minnesota is a state with a large population 
with migrant origins, predominantly Scandinavian but also more recently the Hmong 
refugees. This manifests itself in more flexible social arrangements and integration-
                                                 
16 Harris, Hermoine. The Somali community in the UK: What we know and how we know it. London, 
UK: Information Cenre About Asylum and Refugees in the UK, 2004. 41. 
17 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 11. 
18 Omer, Abdusalam. A Report on Supporting Systems and Procedures for the Effective Regulation and 
Monitoring of Somali Remittance Companies (Hawala). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Development 
Programme in Somalia, 2002. 15. 
 69 
conscious services provided, for example in the sectors of education and health care. 
Minnesota's long history of dealing with diaspora populations has helped foster a more 
welcoming attitude in general.  Additionally, according to Cindy Horst, Minnesota has 
allowed the creation of a "parallel (Somali-styled) economy" that has allowed the 
diaspora population to conduct business in the same manners they would back home.19
 
  
There are Somali shops, Hawalaad outlets, restaurants, and more.  There are also a 
number of dedicated Somali NGOs operating in the two cities.  For many Somali 
businesses in the cities, the built-in diaspora market is a profitable one; providing 
goods and services to the now well-established Somali community in the area can be a 
solid alternative to some of the lower-wage labor-intensive jobs mentioned above.  
So in short, Somalis live in Minnesota because of the opportunities and services 
provided there, the fact that it is a welcoming and relatively safe place to live in and 
because of the large Somali community there. This effect is self-amplifying; as the 
community grows, more and more Somalis have relocated there to be with family, kin, 
or friends.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Horst, Cindy. "Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora." 
Global Migration Perspectives, no. 9 (2004): 10 
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4.4 Shifting Focus 
 
Now that we have established how the Hawalaad works, and why it has been able to 
function so well, we will explore the practical dimensions of the informal economy 
and the Hawalaad system at a larger, more macro-economic level. The subsequent 
chapter will look at "the bigger picture," and analyze various diaspora communities 
and how their remittance activity, which is conducted primarily through the Hawalaad 
conduit, affects and is affected by conditions on the ground in Somalia. This will 
include a discussion on how members of the Somali diaspora have been able to 
successfully negotiate the unstable political and business situation in their homeland, 
and how they go about making critical decisions in their endeavors within Somalia. 
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CHAPTER 5: NAVIGATING DANGEROUS ENVIRONS AND  
MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA 
 
We have discussed the theoretical aspects of diaspora involvement in Somalia, and 
have conducted an analysis of the mechanics of the Hawalaad system as a primary 
avenue for diaspora involvement in Somalia. However, how is the outcome of this 
relationship dictated?  In an environment as reputedly unstable and hostile as Somalia 
has been portrayed, how does an entrepreneur or investor in the diaspora navigate the 
dangerous and complex political terrain?  The notion that guides merchants and 
traders through Somalia's turbulent economy is essentially that all politics are local 
politics.  This means that information about whatever may be affecting business is 
available as long as the traders or merchants are plugged into the right part of the 
network.  
 
This chapter will explore various types of development and investment that have been 
successful on the ground in Somalia, the various social mechanisms in place that have 
facilitated that success, and a discussion about the dangers that must be circumvented 
and how they have been able to do so.   
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5.1 TRUST AS THE PRIMARY MECHANISM FOR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
As was evident in the preceding chapter, relationships in Somalia are largely built on 
trust.  This is particularly the case between the diaspora and the myriad traders and 
middlemen with whom they do business.  Because of so many variables known and 
unknown as well as the fact that very large sums of cash are involved, diaspora 
entrepreneurs and investors rely solely on trust, usually in their clan and sub-clan ties, 
to ensure honesty and success in their endeavors.  This relationship was present before 
the fall of Barre but the ensuing political and clan-based turmoil has only served to 
reinforce this particular basis of business relationships.1
 
 
Clan lineage and genealogy has grown to be the main determinant on whether 
someone can or can not be trusted.2
 
  This notion of political and business division 
based on genealogy has been present throughout Somalia's history, but has become the 
principle mode of determining trust after the combination of the collapse of the central 
government along with the violent manifestations of clanism that broke forth in the 
subsequent power vacuum. As noted by Anna Simons in 1998, this dynamic "brutally 
insured that other forms of identity do not occupy political space."  
                                                 
1 Ahmed, Ismail, and Reginald H. Green. "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and 
Somaliland: Local Level Effects." Third World Quarterly, no. 20 (1999): 125. 
2 Simons, Anna. Somalia: The Structure of Dissolution. In The African State at a Critical Juncture: 
Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration. Eds. Leonardo Villalon and Phillip Huxtable, 57-73. 
Boulder, CO, 1998. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 60. 
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These amplified divisions have the potential to spark new conflicts and accelerate any 
pre-existing hostility or mistrust between clans or sub-clans, since social interaction 
and communication are vital for facilitating trust-based relationships.3  However, there 
are many Somali entrepreneurs that have long understood the inverse of this 
relationship, and have maintained high degrees of communication and social 
interaction, existing within the framework of various societal networks that provide 
invaluable information.  Surprisingly, the seemingly innumerable variables involved in 
Somalia's conflicts and clan-based society have seemingly become more manageable 
in recent years. For example, while commerce has clearly been affected by protracted 
conflict, it has not been affected exactly how one might have expected.  The departure 
of the "peace-building" entities and the UN by mid-1995 actually seemed to bring a 
degree of stability to the local economy.4  A quote from an unpublished paper cited by 
Michael Van Notten in 1998 states that "business is booming in this unusual country 
where taxation and government regulation used to destroy almost all private business 
ventures… its sin is that it defeated the UN army that came to restore the central 
government that the Somali nation had abolished in 1991."5  Somalia saw trade, in a 
blend of formal and informal contexts, increase substantially despite the lack of any 
state financial apparatuses, such as a central bank or ministry of finance.6
                                                 
3 Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
112-113. 
  Somalis 
have been able to figure the way to avoid much of the "unpredictable" through the 
social networking, both within their own clan lineages and by linking up through a 
4 Prunier, Gerard. "Somaliland Goes It Alone." Current History, no. 97 (1998): 223. 
5 Van Notten, Michael (under pen name Graham Green). "Laissez Faire in Africa." Economic 
Government Group, 1998,  http://www.econgov.org/articles/index.shtml. Unpublished paper. 
6 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 
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variety of other societal-market constructs, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
5.2 NAVIGATING A TREACHEROUS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
The major problem for Somalis from all walks of life, abroad or at home, continues to 
be the region's vast insecurity and instability.  This insecurity causes obvious problems 
for the Somalia's commercial community: diaspora entrepreneurs, remittance receivers 
on the ground, and of course the various remittance company agents who are 
responsible for collecting and distributing hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash on 
a daily basis.   
 
5.2.1 Hawalaad Operators and Security 
To counter threats to security, remittance companies are forced to adopt a number of 
direct and indirect countermeasures.  While the role of the Hawalaad is known and 
generally respected by Somalis across all clan-lines,7 the resources and amounts of 
cash involved in daily transactions presents a constant security threat regardless of the 
situation.  Directly, remittance companies are forced to hire their own protection, 
which frequently involves a makeshift solution often involving a mix of local 
militiamen, fellow clansmen, or "professional" security groups.8
                                                 
7 Medani, Khalid. "Financing Terrorism or Survival?: Informal Finance and State Collapse in Somalia, 
and the US War on Terrorism." Middle East Report, no. 223 (2002): 3. 
  While all Hawalaad 
8 Lindley, Anna. Somalia Country Study. Oxford, UK: University of Oxford Centre on Migration, 
Policy, and Society, 2005. 10. 
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firms are founded and generally affiliated with one particular clan,9 it is only on 
occasion that they would discriminate in terms of their clientele or in terms of 
facilitating security for themselves.10  Armed militia forces sometimes wax and wane 
with power in a particular region, and the Hawalaad companies have been sometimes 
forced to rely more on the "protection" money paid to any contending factions in the 
area as more of a deterrent than the actual "protection" offered by those militias.  The 
cost of hiring such physical protection starts remarkably low and generally ends up 
prohibitively expensive.  One researcher reported that heavily-armed protection or 
escort cost around five US dollars per person, per day in 2004,11 while other reports 
indicate that armed guards can often charge more than 40 or 50 US dollars per day.12
 
  
By paying off both sides of the conflict in a discreet manner, Hawalaad companies 
work to guarantee some measure of security by ensuring that they do not become a 
target of either side.   
Additionally, at certain points in time, a Hawaladar with more cash than necessary is 
required to send some of his excess funds to a Hawaladar with insufficient funds.  
These trips often require crossing through areas under the control or influence of 
                                                 
9 Menkhaus, Kenneth. "Remittance Companies and Money Transfers in Somalia." Unpublished paper, 
(2001): 5. 
10 Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." In The Migration-
Development Nexus, eds. Nicholas Van Hear and Nina Sorenson, 233-258. Geneva, Switzerland, 2003. 
The International Organization for Migration. 247. 
11 Samatar, Abdi, and Phil O'Keefe. "Revisiting Somalia." Review of African Political Economy, no. 31 
(2004): 535. 
12 Fisher, Ian. "Somali Businesses Stunted by Too-Free Enterprise." Mogadishu Journal. 2000. 
Available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/somalia.htm. Internet; accessed 7 February 2009. 
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various parties, and merit their own armed escort.13
 
  However, in less contested 
regions, the security situation is much less convoluted, with business cleared and 
sanctioned by whichever group is in charge for that particular region.  Physical 
security might be provided by employees of the company itself, often family or clan 
members.  Clan tradition as a mechanism for security is more effective, and thus more 
pronounced, in these situations of lesser severity.  
This notion of assuming "in-house" security measures also manifests itself within the 
indirect, or preventative measures undertaken by Hawalaad companies to bypass the 
dangers of operating a purely cash business in Somalia. These measures include 
employing intensive screening procedures for all of their staff and, as is becoming 
more common in Western remittance-sending countries, their customers as well.  For 
example, all companies have hundreds of employees stationed throughout the country. 
Potential employees are assessed on their knowledge of the geographical regions, 
financial procedures, telecommunications skills, and computer abilities.14
                                                 
13 Shire, Saad. "Somali Remittance Companies and their Clients" in "Remittances and Economic 
Development in Somalia: An Overview." Ed. Maimbo, Samuel.  The World Bank Social Development 
Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction, no. 38 (2006): 29. 
  Once the 
necessary job qualifications are fulfilled, the potential employees are then screened for 
proof of identity, which is increasingly difficult in a country lacking a central 
government and thus any recognized form of official identification documentation and 
educational records that the individual has.  The companies then identify the 
individual's clan and community and use references from neighbors, family members, 
14 Omer, Abdusalam, and Gina El Koury. "Regulation and Supervision in a Vacuum: The Story of the 
Somali Remittance Sector." In Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects, eds. Samuel 
Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, 226-243. Washington, DC, 2005. The World Bank. 232. 
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elders, and other community leaders to prove the prospective employee's identity, 
trustworthiness, and reliability.15
 
 
Finally, Hawalaad operations look to protect themselves and their customers against 
theft or other business violations by the prospective employee.  The remittance 
companies initially require the individual to provide a substantial amount of collateral, 
sometimes personally, but usually through a family member who has money or 
businesses, of several thousand US dollars. Once the collateral is provided and the 
employee is hired, the individual is prohibited from conducting transactions above the 
amount of the collateral. Therefore, should something go awry, the Hawalaad 
company maintains a claim back on its money and can insure its customers against a 
loss.16
 
   
5.2.2 Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Security 
Networking and information gathering have been correlated to greater social 
resilience,17
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
 and nowhere is this relationship more evident than in Somalia's business 
sector. With all of the dangerous brands of uncertainty facing economic activities in 
Somalia, successful merchants at home or abroad have always been adaptable, 
inductive information aggregators and usually maintain market relationships on as 
many sides of as many conflicts as possible. Because businessmen are generally 
suspicious and untrusting of unknown middlemen and traders, they often rely on social 
16 Ibid. 233. 
17 Winkels, Alexandra, Neil Adgers, Mick P. Kelly, Luong Q. Huy, and Catherine Locke. "Migration, 
Remittances, Livelihood Trajectories, and Social Resilience." Ambio Journal of the Royal Swedish 
Academy , no. 31 (2002): 359. 
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networks and means to reinforce business relationships.  These include networking 
with any actor that might be beneficial to business, including market middlemen, 
militia leaders, religious figures, and clan authorities.18
 
 
Trade has always figured prominently into Somalia's economy, and today the situation 
is not too much different.  Somalia's economy has since long before the collapse of the 
state been external and market-oriented. The presence of a far-flung commercial 
diaspora and the compression of time and space offered by telecommunications 
technologies have only reinforced this, and an environment relatively devoid of state 
economic interference further compounds this notion. Traders and merchants in 
Somalia's border regions have always invoked ethnic and cultural relations in order to 
facilitate improved business.  No matter what the regional economic trend, feast or 
famine, these social relations would be used by a trader or businessman to 
simultaneously provide valuable security information as well as leverage his way into 
new markets. 
 
Addressing physical security concerns that cannot be bypassed with technology or 
social networking is remarkably straightforward in most investments or trades in 
Somalia today. Those with the money simply pay for security forces, usually armed 
militiamen, to ensure safety during transactions or construction endeavors. Warning 
information indicating when or where there may be an outbreak of violence is often 
available, and most of Somalia's larger-scale businesses maintain information 
                                                 
18 Menkhaus, Kenneth. "Remittance Companies and Money Transfers in Somalia." Unpublished paper, 
(2001): 6. 
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networks that blend a number of clans, alignments, and regional powers that allows 
them to stay abreast of any security dilemma that may arise and negatively affect their 
business.19  Somali societal traditions of flexibility and fluidity remain key attributes 
for many business projects in Somalia:20 many entrepreneurs that operate in a number 
of regions can afford to halt business, permanently or temporarily, in the event that 
they receive information that a looming problem might be too costly to overcome, 
such as a militia or political faction seeking to see that business out of the market.  
However, such scenarios are surprisingly rare in Somalia, where local powers would 
rather make use of a service and possibly enjoy a substantial "discount" for presiding 
over that business' territory.21
 
 
By nature, Somali traders and businessmen are particularly wary when they are 
operating outside of their home regions as "stranger" traders.  When these larger-scale 
traders are unable to rely on familial or kinship ties in their regions of business, they 
instead seek to foster similar relationships and information networks using a form of 
clientele-ism.22
                                                 
19 Maimbo, Samuel, Mayank Patel, Walter Mahler, and Hussein Siad. "Financial Sector Developments 
in Somalia: Central Banking and Financial Services in an Uncertain Environment" in "Remittances and 
Economic Development in Somalia: An Overview." Ed. Maimbo, Samuel.  The World Bank Social 
Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction, no. 38 (2006): 49. 
  These relationships can be constructed, built upon, and even 
mobilized, and are particularly useful in times of uncertainty and crisis.  For example, 
large-scale Somali traders based in Dubai still maintain information-gathering 
20 Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." In The Migration-
Development Nexus, eds. Nicholas Van Hear and Nina Sorenson, 233-258. Geneva, Switzerland, 2003. 
The International Organization for Migration. 255. 
21 Akam, Simon. "Mobile success emerges amid the mayhem." The Financial Times. 2006. Available 
from http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto100320061137399483&page=2. Internet; 
accessed 10 March 2009. 
22 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 125. 
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relationships with contacts on the ground ranging from market middlemen to religious 
figures23 to militiamen to current and even former business partners.24
 
  However, these 
relationships also have the capacity to sour quickly in the face of competition, 
particularly in a free market as distorted as the one in Somalia.  
It is also important to note that these mechanisms are far from wholly effective.  
Rather, they simply represent the best, most effective coping tools available to 
entrepreneurs and businessmen operating in Somalia.  Armed convoys are still 
requisite if traveling along certain dangerous routes or traveling with a substantial 
amount of money.25  Business still suffers from bouts of banditry and random 
outbreaks of violence, but the system in place today allows those in business to 
minimize the frequency and effects of such problems.26
 
 
5.2.3 Remittance Receivers and Security 
Fortunately, most remittance receivers fall under the umbrella of security drawn over 
the remittance companies themselves.  Remarkably, the security situation for many of 
the "lifeline" remittance receiving demographic in Somalia has been fairly stable.27
                                                 
23 Ballard, Roger. "Hawala Transformed: Remittance-driven Transnational Networks in the post-
Imperial economic order." University of Manchester Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, 
Conference paper. (2004): 14. 
  
This is unlike the situation for Somali refugees in neighboring Kenya, where 
24 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 118, 164. 
25 Doyle, Mark. "Somalia's Security Nightmare." BBC News.  2008. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7281539.stm. Internet; accessed 18 January 2009. 
26 Lindley, Anna. Somalia Country Study. Oxford, UK: University of Oxford Centre on Migration, 
Policy, and Society, 2005. 7-8. 
27 Menkhaus, Kenneth. "State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts." Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 30 (2003): 407. 
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harassment, abuse, and robbery is a constant problem for people receiving money 
from relatives abroad.28  The remittance pick up process in most parts of Somalia is 
not particularly fraught with danger, as most remittance receivers are very familiar 
with their local Hawaladar and are equally aware of the surrounding socio-political 
climate.  Security remains a top concern for many remittance receivers.  However 
other portentous threats loom with equal severity.  In Somalia's border areas and 
among the pastoralist communities, threats of disease or drought are usually more 
worrisome and more potentially disastrous than a shift in political influence in the 
same region.29
 
   
While sharp challenges to this idea of ethnic trust were particularly evident during the 
years of a centralized government, evidenced by acts of violence, corruption, or theft, 
the situation at the community level has stabilized significantly as residents generally 
subscribe to some form of local governance.  Improved security conditions, due 
primarily to the more predictable cycles of fighting that emerged following the exit of 
the US and UN, have resulted in a combination of lowered market transaction costs 
and higher impetus for the remittance senders to transfer money back home.  The costs 
of most financial services eventually mirrored their prices from the pre-war period, 
and in most cases today have actually dropped substantially lower, with the security 
situation accounted for as well as possible.  
 
                                                 
28 Campbell, Elizabeth. "Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade 
networks in Nairobi." Global Migration Perspectives, no. 47 (2005): 25. 
29 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 126. 
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5.2.4 Summing Up On-the-Ground Security 
It would seem that many Somalis, businessmen and remittance receivers, have forged 
a path for themselves in what would otherwise seem to be an anarchic environment.  
While security remains a constant and primary worry for those doing business in 
Somalia, other concerns such as transport or excessive competition have become 
equally compelling.30
 
  This in itself is indicative of the gradual stabilization that has 
occurred as a byproduct of the success of Somalia's informal economy.  However, it is 
important to remember the original context of the situation in order to avoid portraying 
the system currently in place as anything but a dysfunctional path in which there is 
rarely a better alternative.  It remains the case that these dimensions of security 
provided by cultural or societal-based ties are regularly and sharply challenged by the 
ever-present violence in Somalia. Somalia's commercial community today still finds 
itself obligated to pay bribes, tariffs, or fees to various faction leaders or militia 
commanders in order to make use of certain routes or for port usage.   
While acts of brutality and violence are often seemingly random to outside observers, 
many traders and entrepreneurs have found ways of navigating these dangerous 
business environs; it has become a matter of being plugged into the right social 
networks.31
                                                 
30 Waldo, Mohamed. "Somalia Remittances: Myth and Reality" in "Remittances and Economic 
Development in Somalia: An Overview." Ed. Maimbo, Samuel.  The World Bank Social Development 
Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction, no. 38 (2006): 22. 
  In addition, the spread of telecommunications technologies have 
tightened these networks and exponentially sped up the information gathering process.  
 
31 Menkhaus, Kenneth. "State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts." Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 30 (2003): 411. 
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Indeed, shrewd Somalis local or abroad, remittance receivers or businessmen, are able 
to stay abreast of developments in their own local political situation by making use of 
the unique social networks found in Somali culture. 
 
 
5.3 FLESHING OUT SOMALIA'S HUMAN INFORMATION NETWORKS 
 
Within the Somali framework, economic agents such as middlemen and traders have 
not been particularly negatively impacted by the collapse of the state.  In fact, these 
actors have grown to fill the void of left by Somalia's lack of political and economic 
institutions.  Somalia's economy relies on a few actors not found in the formal systems 
found elsewhere. There are bewildering layers of buyers, sellers, and agents 
representing each side of a transaction within Somalia's informal economic network.  
In fact, very little has changed over the course of the past two decades in terms of 
social networking with the exception of the technology used and the scope involved.  
Cash is still the dominant form of market transaction, although some traders and 
businessman may advance a small amount of credit to certain known middlemen. 
Even on nominal amounts of credit or paid small fees in cash, those middlemen have a 
vested interested in that particular business endeavor's profitability.   
 
The relationship is almost symbiotic, in which businessmen must trust that the 
middlemen will help negotiate the best possible deals, honestly report sales and market 
conditions present in the operation's area, and of course not abscond with the money.  
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The middlemen depend on the good business to improve their own long-term financial 
prospects.  Many actors in Somali society invariably serve as middlemen in some 
capacity or another while simultaneous filling other social roles.  A thorough 
discussion of these actors and their various functions in Somalia would be beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, two key actors in Somali society known as the Dilaal 
and the Nabadoon will be discussed, with an emphasis on their roles within Somali 
markets. 
 
5.3.1 The Dilaal:  
The term Dilaal comes from the Arabic language, meaning a person who serves as a 
middleman and facilitates negotiations.  The Dilaal in Somalia is an individual who 
works in a market, and may represent buyers, sellers, or both simultaneously.  As an 
actor in smaller market affairs, the Dilaal is actually a common market feature across 
Islamic parts of East and West Africa.32
                                                 
32 Cohen, Abner. Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of Berkeley Press, 
1969. 
  The Dilaal stakes his reputation and word on 
the fairness of prices, the veracity of claimed market conditions, and the reputations of 
his own clients to each other or other Dilaals. Dilaals also are often responsible for 
intelligence gathering, particularly with concern to security situations. Areas of 
hostility and open conflict are usually well-known in Somalia, and are easily avoided 
if one is plugged into the social networks properly. Additionally, the right Dilaal may 
be able to facilitate "passage" through such a conflict zone if the combination of clan 
affiliation and bribes or "fees" is right.  The Dilaal also acts as a guard against the sale 
of stolen animals or stolen products.  This relationship between merchants, buyers or 
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sellers, and the Dilaal is built almost exclusively on trust. Because so many variables 
and relative unknowns exist when conducting business in an economy such as 
Somalia's, the role of trust is paramount when one considers the fact that any notions 
such as "legal recourse" are nonexistent. 
 
The Dilaal as an actor also represents a further blurring of the formal to informal 
distinction in Somalia.  Today, all Dilaals are registered with their local governance or 
administrative authorities, usually militia commanders or clan elders, and they often 
pay a fee to act as "official" market brokers and middlemen.  This echoes the Dilaal 
situation prior to the collapse of the state, in which Dilaals were required to register 
with the local and national governments as well as pay a nominal amount of taxes.33
 
 
 
5.3.2 The Nabadoon:  
The role of the Nabadoon is rooted in clan structure as a sort of local political 
negotiator, a person who helps ensure mutual approval on business transactions and 
helps to mediate any conflicts that may arise.  While this is closely related to the 
function served by the Dilaal, the Nabadoon is able to work with more diverse 
leadership figures outside of the market framework.  The Nabadoon works with clan 
elders and local authority figures, which includes figures as diverse as religious 
clerics, militia leaders, clan elders, and even Somali women's associations.34
                                                 
33 Little, Peter. African Issues: Somalia: Economy Without a State. Bloomington, Indiana: The 
International Africa Institute, 2003. 109. 
  The 
34 Menkhaus, Kenneth. "Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society." Current History, no. 97 
(1998): 220. 
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Nabadoon is also frequently responsible for settling Diya payments between Diya 
groups.  Diya groups are social units, ranging from a few people to large portions of 
sub-clans that take collective responsibility for their own security.  Diya groups enter 
agreements with other Diya groups that obligate them to compensate each other in the 
form of Diya payments if any harm or damage is caused by someone under the 
umbrella of their Diya group.35  Diya payments, essentially work as an important 
security tool, as they are essentially a sanction against conflict and violence.  There are 
numerous currencies and commodities in which Diya payments can be settled, 
although the traditional capital exchanged is usually in the form of livestock.  
However, examples of Diya payments exist as diverse as up to 100 camels per person 
killed to forced marriages involving women hailing from the violating clan.36
 
  Diya 
payments grew increasingly irrelevant at the broader levels of society, primarily 
because Diya debts incurred during the periods of extreme violence quickly became 
insurmountable.  However, at the local levels, Diya still functions as a valuable 
security tool and facilitator of information networking. 
 
5.4 FOSTERING STABILITY THROUGH THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
Following the fall of Barre, local Somali communities and later entrepreneurs abroad 
were left to resort to their own devices and to come up with new mechanisms not only 
                                                 
35 Le Sage, Andre. "Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives." Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue, (2005): 5. 
36 Ibid: 33, 36 
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to survive financially but also to defend themselves from the increasingly violence-
prone militias and warlords. Financial abilities became requisite to staving off 
potentially violent encounters with less-than salubrious militiamen operating in the 
vicinity.  It was in this vacuum that the pervasive network of informal finance 
institutions quickly emerged to feed and support the economy as well as help 
disseminate information. 
 
The informal economy has adopted or co-opted a number of characteristics found in 
formal systems, while leaving gaping deficiencies in others.  The Somali shilling, 
despite having no central government to validate it, stabilized significantly following 
the initial drop in value it took following the collapse of the state. Local institutions 
gained in the vacuum, sometimes flourishing in the absence of any sort of top-down 
administrative body.  However, central government and regulated banking fills a 
number of roles that have gone unaddressed since the collapse of the state.  While the 
government in Somaliland has printed some new currencies, many those same ragged 
and withering Somali shilling notes continue to be heavily circulated.  In order to 
preserve the aging currencies while simultaneously defending themselves against 
currency fluctuations, which are largely determined by local markets and political 
activities, the remittance companies deal only in United States dollars. They will 
exchange money for their customers, but only remit and distribute dollars. 
Nevertheless, the currency problem remains a constant issue, especially when large 
sums of money must be converted into the Somali shilling. 
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A central bank traditionally has other critical functions, specifically regarding 
regulating, monitoring, and setting national fiscal policy. Because these functions are 
also lacking, the remittance companies operate in a virtual vacuum.  This vacuum has 
fostered an environment of intense competition that has prevented price fixing from 
occurring and monopolies from being formed.  This dynamic, in conjunction with the 
pre-existing notions of ethnic affinity or cultural obligations, has resulted in 
perpetually improving services, reducing prices, and an expanding customer base.37
 
  
From the outside, it seems that circumnavigating risk and danger in Somalia's business 
landscape would be an impossible endeavor.  However, this chapter has argued that if 
the business person is familiar with their society and locale, the answer to these 
dangers is rather straightforward.   Physical security, while still important, is clearly 
the secondary measure after establishing reliable and trustworthy social networks, and 
using them to aggregate as well as convey information about one's business endeavors.  
While businessmen still find themselves obligated to pay bribes or fines to certain 
actors for "services" such as protection, transit, and so on, the key is that due to the 
complex and inter-connected relationships of trust found between the myriad actors in 
this system, it will rarely stray from what has been agreed upon.  The next chapter will 
look at how some diaspora entrepreneur endeavors have manifested themselves on the 
ground in Somalia. 
                                                 
37 Omer, Abdusalam, and Gina El Koury. "Regulation and Supervision in a Vacuum: The Story of the 
Somali Remittance Sector." In Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects, eds. Samuel 
Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, 226-243. Washington, DC, 2005. The World Bank. 233. 
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CHAPTER 6: DIASPORA-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Despite lacking an effective central government for almost 20 years and the harsh 
conditions associated with such a power vacuum, Somalia's private sector has 
demonstrated an incredible capacity to adapt and in some circumstances, flourish.  
Private enterprises, often spearheaded by diaspora entrepreneurs, have been able to 
make use of their own experience and resources while operating within Somalia's 
networks of trust in what is otherwise a political vacuum.  This relationship, beginning 
with telecommunications and the informal finance sector, has led to easier transactions 
and thus opened the door for other creative business opportunities as well as 
improving the scope of remittance "lifelines" back home.   
 
At the microeconomic level, remittances sent by the Somali diaspora to impoverished 
family members back home go towards food, shelter, and clothing.  In addition to 
paying for these critical necessities, it has also been shown that remittances and 
investments played a major role in local investment, especially in sectors including 
small business startups or real estate.  On the macroeconomic level, diaspora 
remittances have contributed directly to Somalia's booming telecommunications 
sector, informal finance sector, and other privately provided services such as 
electricity, transport, and provision of water.  Secondary investment activities that are
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more socially-oriented such as education and health care have also begun to manifest 
themselves in recent years.   
 
This chapter will initially examine diaspora-driven development in the 
telecommunications sector.  Unlike the informal finance sector, telecommunications 
requires a degree of planning and infrastructure, and in turn, a higher level of 
investment.  As detailed in previous chapters, the spread of informal finance houses 
has been driven substantially by expansion of Somalia's telecommunications capacity.  
Today, the informal system's capacity to be uninhibited by physical or political 
boundaries has essentially been determined by the technologies utilized.  Because 
telecommunications technologies and the nature of Somalia's informal economic 
functions are inherently intertwined, forays into implementing these technologies have 
represented some of the commercial diaspora's earliest and most important endeavors 
back in their homeland.  As mentioned earlier, telecommunications technology 
reduces transaction costs across the board.  In Somalia, these benefits are noticeable 
across all spectrums of society, whether the beneficiary is a diaspora entrepreneur 
calling home to investigate a potential project, a market broker intermediary 
negotiating between parties across town or across the region, or even for the great 
many Somalis who still adhere to traditional lifestyles as pastoralists in the border 
regions or as fishermen on the northern coast.  For example, a Somali fisherman is 
now able to call his various, often geographically far-flung prospective buyers and 
ascertain the best prices for his valuable yet extremely perishable haul before spending 
hours simply getting to each buyer's locale.   It is arguable that the benefits of 
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telecommunications development in Somalia facilitate easier transitions into other 
modes of development.  As such, telecommunications makes sense as the starting 
point in an analysis of diaspora-drive development on the ground in Somalia.  
Subsequent sections will look at the other forms of diaspora-driven development that 
have manifested themselves on the ground in Somalia. 
 
 
6.1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE FIRST SUCCESS STORY 
 
Cell phones were first introduced to Somalia in 1995.  Today, cell phone towers dot 
the landscape, densely packed in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and the other urban centers in 
Somalia.  Coverage is everywhere, and service is rapid; a landline telephone 
connection can be hooked up in less than a day, and cell phone service is provided 
instantly after the initial payment.  Service costs around ten US dollars each month, 
with unlimited local calling and very reasonable international rates.1  Sound quality is 
pristine, even when calling from rural villages.2
 
  Somalia's remarkable 
telecommunications development was driven almost solely by diaspora businessmen 
amidst the opportunity provided by the power vacuum in the early to mid 1990s.   
The window was opened following the government's collapse, and the first 
telecommunications operators, many of whom were residing in the United States at the 
                                                 
1 Winter, Joseph. "Telecoms thriving in lawless Somalia" BBC News.  2004. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm. Internet; accessed 20 February 2009. 
2 Sites, Kevin. In the Hot Zone: One Man, One Year, Twenty Wars. New York, NY: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2007. 60. 
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time, quickly moved in with whatever equipment they had available.  Many of the 
early endeavors into telecommunications within Somalia were patched together with 
cheap and aging equipment, adapting it to best fit their needs.  Somalis that had 
worked for telecommunications firms in the United States brought telephone 
equipment and satellite dishes to Somalia, and began setting up phone booths in some 
of Somalia's smaller towns.3  Early telecommunications access to rural Somali villages 
was often provided with a combination of radio and telephone; the speaker and 
receiver of a hardwired telephone in Mogadishu would be rigged to the speaker and 
receiver of a shortwave radio connected to the remote village in question.4  The advent 
of various avenues of telecommunications certainly facilitated an expansion of the 
scope of business development endeavors in Somalia. Immediately following the exit 
of US and UN assets in the mid-1990s, trade and economic activity was largely 
facilitated by VHF radios, CB radios, and handheld walkie-talkies. The networks 
established with this more limited technological framework provided a base on which 
to expand from once other technologies, notably the internet and e-mail, became more 
accessible.5
 
  
With these piecemeal networks, business began in earnest.  The ongoing lack of 
regulation in conjunction with diaspora investments and inroads has gone on to boost 
telecommunications technology and services in Somalia to among the best in the 
                                                 
3 Dowden, Richard. Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles. London, UK: Portobello Books, 2008. 
115. 
4 Cockburn, Andrew. "Somalia." National Geographic Magazine Online Extra. 2002. Available from 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0207/feature3/fulltext.html. Internet; accessed 10 March 2009. 
5 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International 
Africa Institute, 2008. 147. 
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world.  Today, Somalia boasts around ten established telecommunications service 
providers, many of whom are working in conjunction with Western service providers 
such as American telecom giants ATT6 and Sprint or Norwegian sector stalwart 
Telenor7
 
 in order to provide subscribers with the latest services and technologies. 
The process for procuring the sophisticated equipment required to provide 
telecommunications service demonstrates dependence on Somalis abroad as well as 
both the informal and formal finance sectors.  Most of the telecommunications 
companies operating in Somalia are headquartered outside of the region, usually in 
Dubai or Abu Dhabi.  The Emirates are a hub of business and technology trading, and 
have an extensive formal banking sector along as well as numerous Hawalaad outlets.  
Somali businessmen are able to transfer dollars via Somalia to the companies that 
produce the needed goods.  Despite the lack of a formal banking system, Somalia's 
telecommunications operators have been able to secure equipment deals with very 
large technology firms, including the United States firm Tecore as well as the AirNet 
and Huawei Chinese telecommunications equipment firms. SAF Tehnika, a Latvian 
telecommunications equipment supplier that has sold hardware to the Somalia 
Telecom Group, has described their Somali clients as extremely ambitious yet honest 
about their situation.  Most equipment is shipped to Dubai.  There are three main paths 
for getting the hardware from the Gulf into Somalia.  Most telecommunications 
equipment is then either flown into Hargeisa or Mogadishu via one of Somalia's 
                                                 
6 SomaliaWatch.org. "Surprise Success Story: Somalia's Telecommunications Sector." Somalia Watch 
News. 2007. Available from http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivedec01/020111101.htm. Internet; 
accessed 10 March 2009. 
7 Nenova, Tatiana, and Tim Harford. "Anarchy and Investion: How Does Somalia's Private Sector Cope 
without Government? ." The World Bank Group Public Policy for the Private Sector, no. 280 (2004): 2. 
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private regional airlines headquartered outside the area, or into Djibouti where it is 
later transferred via cargo convoy.8  Successful businessmen have also been able to 
construct their own smaller airstrips or buy use of one of the numerous small, 
ungoverned harbors along Somalia's coast in order to import their equipment.9
 
  
Distribution on the ground is generally quick and straightforward; first a security 
detail comprised of local power is hired, and then cell phone towers are put up and 
phone lines are laid.   
The effects of this form of development are as equally apparent in Mogadishu or 
Hargeisa as it is in some of Somalia's more rural regions.  For example, the Somali 
border-trading town of Garissa, traditionally dependent on livestock trading, has 
become a hub for informal currency exchange agents and various telecommunications 
centers, including low-cost, private access to telephones, internet access, and fax 
machines.  The success of these institutions in the oft-dire conditions in the Somali 
border regions is evident; top-flight computers and telecommunications technology 
being used in clean, modern offices adorned with fresh paint and framed pictures. This 
is often a stunning contrast when compared to other shops or businesses in the same 
area. 
 
According to statistics from the World Cellular Information Service and the 
International Telecommunications Union, the number of cellular phone users in 
                                                 
8 Akam, Simon. "Mobile success emerges amid the mayhem." The Financial Times. 2006. Available 
from http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto100320061137399483&page=2. Internet; 
accessed 10 March 2009. 
9 Winter, Joseph. "Telecoms thriving in lawless Somalia" BBC News.  2004. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm. Internet; accessed 20 February 2009. 
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Somalia has exploded to over 650,000 in 2007.10
 
  This figure, coupled with the lowest 
international calling rates in the entire continent of Africa, highlight the globalized 
nature of what is still essentially a community-based society.  The following 
subsections will detail some of the more successful telecommunications service 
providing companies in Somalia, with three goals in mind.  First, the intrinsic role of 
the diaspora entrepreneur will be highlighted in practical terms.  Second, the gradual 
evolution and professionalization of Somalia's telecommunications companies 
evidences a potential starting point to the notion of a gradual "formalization" of 
Somalia's largely informal business and finance sectors.  Finally, discussion of these 
different companies will draw a connection to the idea that telecommunications 
development has and is serving as a crucial "first step" that has facilitated a number of 
other avenues in development in Somalia. 
6.1.1 SOMALIA TELECOM GROUP 
An excellent example of diaspora-driven telecommunications development in Somalia 
can be found in the Somali Telecom Group.  The company was founded in Rockville, 
Maryland in the United States in 1993.  To this day, founders Abdirazak Osman, 
Edmund Resor, Adidaziz Dualeh, and Luis George claim to have created Somalia's 
first-ever telecommunications service provider.11
                                                 
10 Information taken from the ICT Eye Statistics Tool, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/icteye/DisplayCountry.aspx?code=SOM. 
  The men, with varying levels of 
Western education and backgrounds in business or telecommunications, invested 
substantial amounts of money into erecting telecommunications infrastructure in 
11 "About the Somali Telecom Group." SomaliTelecomGroup.com. Available from 
http://www.somalitelecomgroup.com/index.php. Internet; accessed 14 February 2009. 
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Somalia via the Hawalaad system.  In the unregulated environs of Somalia, securing 
real estate to build cell phone towers was relatively easy and inexpensive; Somalis 
with clan or familial links to the founders were paid nominal sums to essentially place 
cell phone towers in their backyards.  This money was cleared through the same 
channels as the "lifeline" remittances that one might presume the company's founders 
were already sending back to many of those same people at home.   
 
In the budding years of the Somali Telecom Group, the primary services offered 
included basic domestic and international telephone and faxing services.  Over the past 
17 years, the group has evolved quickly as new technology became available, offering 
cellular phone services and high-speed internet connections before many centrally-
governed states in Africa were able to afford their populations similar levels of access.  
The company has remained highly profitable despite the numerous obstacles in its 
path.  According to Guled Abdikadir Hassan, Somalia Telecom Group's Manager of 
Development, around 30 percent of the company's expenses go towards security.  
Hassan also indicated that his company often finds itself compromising between good 
business planning and submitting to local political powers; a local warlord or 
militiaman may be put in a supervisory or managerial role in a new STG endeavor 
despite the fact that they have numerous more qualified staff on hand.12
                                                 
12 Akam, Simon. "Mobile success emerges amid the mayhem." The Financial Times. 2006. Available 
from http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto100320061137399483&page=2. Internet; 
accessed 10 March 2009. 
  Mustafa 
Sheikh, a business director with the Somalia Telecom Group who was educated at 
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Berkeley University in California, has praised the possibilities afforded by the 
flexibility that his company has been able to exhibit in pursuing these ends.13
 
   
The group began by offering telecommunications services in Hargeisa, which had 
become the capital of Somaliland.  Services in Mogadishu began in earnest in 1998, 
after the installation of a small, budget-friendly network of telecommunications 
infrastructure.  The company currently has offices scattered across Somalia, but is 
headquartered in Dubai. Company-client as well as interdepartmental finances are now 
handled in-house, but in the earlier years of the Somali Telecom Group's existence 
they were funneled via the informal channels between Mogadishu and Dubai.   
 
The Somalia Telecom Group has expanded and branched out to include a number of 
subsidiaries in telecommunications as well as other related sectors.  As of 2007, the 
Somali Telecom Group and its affiliates were present in virtually all urbanized 
localities in Somalia as well as a number of more rural regions.  Netco Somalia is 
another outstanding example of diaspora entrepreneurism as an affiliate of the Somalia 
Telecom Group.  Netco Somalia provides telecommunications services in the semi-
autonomous Puntland region of Somalia.  Netco Somalia was also founded by a 
diaspora entrepreneur; Ismael Haji Abdi, an MBA graduate from Wisconsin 
University in the United States.  Today, Netco Somalia is the largest 
telecommunications operator in Puntland, and one of the largest in Somalia as a 
whole.  Netco Somalia reportedly has over 750,000 service subscribers. The company 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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supplies basic landline telephony as well as cellular phones and high-speed internet 
services.  Haji Abdi has also stated that his company's next big endeavor will be to 
privately provide electricity to the residents of Puntland, with a plan to do just that 
over the next five years.  This expanded business endeavor foreshadows the next 
sections of this chapter; namely the secondary and tertiary business endeavors being 
undertaken in Somalia following the successes of informal finance and 
telecommunications. 
 
6.1.2 TELCOM SOMALILAND & TELCOM SOMALIA 
Telcom Somaliland is one of the most successful telecommunications service provider 
in Somaliland, and was among the first large-scale privately owned firms to operate in 
the territory. Telcom Somaliland also highlights the transnational nature of business in 
Somalia; while the company is technically headquartered in Hargeisa, much of its 
business planning, accounting, and regulatory body relations take place in its satellite 
offices in Dubai and London.14  Telcom adheres to financial regulations laid out in 
both the Emirates and in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that it operates 
exclusively in a virtually lawless region.  The company currently formally employs 
almost 500 employees, but is part of a conglomerate that also includes Telcom 
Somalia which employs around 1500.15
                                                 
14 "About Telcom Somaliland." Welcome to Telcom Somaliland Official Website. Available from 
http://www.telcomsomaliland.com/about.htm. Internet; accessed 14 February 2009. 
  Virtually all employees are Somali, many of 
whom moved out of Somalia and became members of the diaspora after acquiring 
their jobs with Telcom Somalia.  The Telcom Somaliland and Telcom Somalia 
15 "Telcom Somalia About Us: Profile." Telcom Somalia: Hearty Welcome!. Available from 
http://www.telcom-somalia.com/. Internet; accessed 14 February 2009. 
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company presidents were educated in the West, as were several of the companies' 
higher level executives. 
  
6.1.3 SOMAFONE 
Somafone is the final mini-case study to be addressed in this section, not because of 
the company's diaspora ties or the expansion of their business into other sectors, but 
because of the degree of formality the company has adopted despite being 
headquartered in Mogadishu.  Somafone business policies perhaps represent one of the 
more poignant indicators along the continuum of the evolution from informal to 
formal that has been an undertone throughout this study.  Somafone is another one of 
Somalia's leading cellular service providers, and was founded as a corporate 
subsidiary of Dubai's Internet City.  Somafone is headquartered in Mogadishu but 
offers services that one would expect in Dubai. The company adheres to international 
standards and regulations for telecommunications, a practice that has been rare in 
Somalia's telecom boom over the past decade. The company relies on an interesting 
business model that hybridizes international business standards with a deep local 
information network, allowing the company to forge a path through Somalia's murky 
political environments, bypass occasional conflicts or outbreaks of violence, and 
negotiate profitable business deals with local powers with relatively little in the way of 
losses, both in a corporate financial sense but also in terms of services for their 
customers.  Somafone's customer-service model is based on those found in other parts 
of the world with extensive telecommunications development, with 24 hour customer 
service representation available, credit with paper or electronic billing, and simple, 
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printed refund or exchange policies. The formal customer service and billing plans 
give Somafone a degree of professionalism not likely to be found in other sectors in 
Somalia, and could represent a step towards a more cohesive, formal, and perhaps 
regulated market.   
 
The contrast between the nature of Somali mobile phone services in 1995 and those of 
Somafone or any of the other more polished Somali telecommunications companies in 
2009 is stark, and demonstrates the possibilities for rapid development in Somalia in 
economic, technological, and formality terms. 
 
 
6.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AS A STEP TOWARDS BROADER DEVELOPMENT 
 
The limited statistics available on the proliferation of telecommunications access in 
Somalia are still telling.  The number of telephones per one thousand people increased 
over 700 percent between 1990 and 2005, according to the United Nations' 
International Telecommunications Union agency.16
                                                 
16 Information taken from the ICT Eye Statistics Tool, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/icteye/DisplayCountry.aspx?code=SOM. 
  While the telecommunications 
sector has been growing at an astounding rate across the globe over the past decade, 
Somalia still remains an outlier in almost every measured telecommunications 
statistical category.  From here, telecommunications development can be viewed as a 
primer for a myriad of other forms of investment.  For example, the combined effects 
of informal finance sector development and telecommunications development, 
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manifesting themselves in things like wire transfers, which despite being difficult to 
measure have clearly served as a catalyst for a whole range of other economic 
activities.   
 
The success of telecommunications development under the context of de facto 
deregulation has stimulated growth in a number of other sectors.  The initial 
significant private investments, mostly stemming from the diaspora in one way or 
another, came in the sectors of informal money transfer services and 
telecommunications.  Investment into other privately provided goods and services 
such as air transport, hotels, and the production of foodstuffs and beverages have also 
come about.  Even more interesting is the provision of services with a much higher 
potential for private to public benefit spillover, such as electricity and potable water.  
Along this same evolution, it should be noted that increasing private entrepreneurial 
attention has been paid towards less obviously profitable sectors such as education and 
health.17
 
  The gradual increase of attention paid to investing in goods with higher 
levels of potential benefit spillover from private to public represents one of the most 
important manners that the private sector has been able to manifest itself in a way that 
fills some of the vacuum left by a lack of central government.   
 
 
                                                 
17 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International 
Africa Institute, 2008. 140. 
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6.3 BRANCHING OUT IN BUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT  
 
With the implementation of effective telecommunications services and the steadfast 
Hawalaad system, Somalia's diaspora is increasingly investing, either directly or 
indirectly, in myriad other sectors.  Many of these second-stage investment projects 
have facilitated improved quality of life for Somali residents, whether through the 
provision of electricity, potable water, or other services.  Urban and rural Somalis 
have both been able to take advantage of these services to some extent, and definitely 
more so than in the years following the fall of Barre. 
 
Abdi Rizak Osman is a Somali entrepreneur who began supplying electricity via 
imported generators in the central Somali town of Galcaio, near the border with 
Ethiopia.  It should be noted that Osman's original businesses were rooted in mobile 
phones and money transfer services.  In 2002, Osman's generators provided electricity 
for homes for a fee, but also provided electricity for the town's hospital and some 
street lights without charge.18
 
  While this spirit of community service is not 
necessarily rare in Somalia, it should be noted that Galcaio is relatively ethnically 
homogenous and devoid of clan or sub-clan tension. 
Abdul Dini is a Somali businessman who has transformed substantial remittance 
investments into a number of profitable businesses.  Besides being a partner to one of 
Somalia's landline telephony groups, he had diversified his investments into other 
                                                 
18 Cockburn, Andrew. "Somalia." National Geographic Magazine Online Extra. 2002. Available from 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0207/feature3/fulltext.html. Internet; accessed 10 March 2009. 
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business sectors including foodstuffs and construction.  Among Dini's 2002 business 
portfolio were a plastics factory, a mineral water filtering and bottling plant, a pasta 
factory, and a bakery.19  Numerous other private services have sprouted up in various 
parts of Somalia, including those in the way of ground transport, mechanical services, 
and even garbage collection.20
 
 
Perhaps the most iconic example of diaspora-driven investment in Somalia following 
government failure came in the summer of 2004, when a Coca-Cola bottling plant 
opened in Merka, just south of Mogadishu.  The factory was opened by Somalia's 
United Bottling Company president Abdi Risak Isse, a Somali businessman with 
substantial support from the Somali diaspora.21
 
  Sharif Ahmad Ba'alawi, the 
previously mentioned Chairman of the Somali Business Council in Dubai also owns a 
stake in the factory.  The factory has been largely successful, and employs more than 
100 Somalis in the town.  
Air transport into and throughout Somalia has been another focal point of diaspora 
investments.  The sector has been largely successful; a number of regional airlines 
serve Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Borama, and the northern port city of Bossaso.  Star 
African Airlines, based out of Dubai, a largely diaspora-driven company in its earlier 
phases, has become one of the largest Somali companies outside of the financial 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Fisher, Ian. "Somali Businesses Stunted by Too-Free Enterprise." Mogadishu Journal. 2000. 
Available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/somalia.htm. Internet; accessed 7 February 2009. 
21 Ferrett, Grant. "Coca-Cola makes Somalia Return" BBC News.  6 July 2004. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3865595.stm. Internet; accessed 11 January 2009. 
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services sector.  For a small private airline, Star African Airlines boasts substantial 
regional operations, with regular domestic flights across Somalia, regular flights to 
and from the United Arab Emirates, and intermittent charter flights to North Africa 
and Europe.  Jubba Airways, another Somali airline headquartered in Dubai, is a 
similar story.  It was founded in 1998 by a group of savvy Somali diaspora 
entrepreneurs who had been residing in Calgary, Canada.  The men utilized their 
extensive connections with local businessmen on the ground, and were able to get the 
airline up and running in short order despite the instability of the situation.  Today, 
Jubba has regular flights connecting Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Bosaso in Somalia 
with destinations in Kenya, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the United Arab 
Emirates.22
 
 
Other interesting examples of this broadening scope of diaspora involvement include 
the relatively newly-constructed Ambassador Hotel in Hargeisa, the rebuilt tuna 
canning factory in Las Qoray, and the Amoud University in Borama.  Another 
fascinating example is the Somali diaspora-based association, SomScan and UK 
Cooperative Associations, with members in different European countries, which 
pooled resources to build a new settlement of 330 houses in the city of Burco, 
Somaliland.23
                                                 
22"About Us: Jubba Airways." JubbaAirways.com. Available from http://www.jubba-
airways.com/about.asp . Internet; accessed 22 February 2009. 
  This is reminiscent of the community foundation development efforts 
in home countries carried out by Latin American diaspora members residing in the 
23 Kleist, Naja. "Somali-Scandinavian Dreaming: Visions of Home and Return in Somscan and UK 
Cooperative Associations." Sussex Centre for Migration Research, Conference Paper, (2004). 
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US.  This model of diaspora philanthropy development has been largely successful 
and praised for its innovation.24
 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, it seems that many of these services initially provided by diaspora 
investment and the private sector are more widely available than even before the 
collapse of the government.  New privately-funded health clinics and primary schools 
began popping up in earnest as early as 1997.  While the quality of these facilities is 
poor, the fact that they exist is telling.  A recently opened mental hospital in 
Somaliland has been faulted for antiquated and oppressive treatment regimens.  
Despite the valid criticism, some Somaliland officials make the point in noting that at 
least the facility exists and is accessible, something that certain other centrally-
governed states cannot boast.25
 
  Major problems clearly remain in the nascent Somali 
health sector. These include a disturbing lack of professionals and inadequate 
resources, and problems stemming from this are further compounded by the lack of 
central government.   
The emergence of private health clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals is notable for 
several reasons.  These facilities are largely funded by diaspora investments.  
                                                 
24 Orozco, Manuel. "Diasporas, Philanthropy and Hometown Associations: The Central American 
Experience." Paper prepared for the Global Equity Initiative Conference, Harvard University May 
2006. 
 
25 Gettleman, Jeffrey, "The Other Somalia: An Island of Stability in a Sea of Armed Chaos," New York 
Times, 7 March 2007. Accessed on 6 January, 2008 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/world/africa/07somaliland.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%22The%20Ot
her%20Somalia%22&st=cse. 
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Interestingly enough, diaspora support also goes towards both emergency as well as 
common medical treatment in these same facilities.  The focus of Somali health care 
has remained largely curative, with not as much investment into primary health care.26  
Expenditure for sanitation or preventative health care is virtually nonexistent. Access 
to these health services in Somalia are generally reliant on one or more of the 
following; remittance funding, clan affiliation, and conventional humanitarian aid 
afforded by non-governmental organizations.  The former is perhaps most interesting, 
in which remittances fund health services within clinics originally built on diaspora 
investments.  The Somali health care sector seems bound to this inefficient, semi-
charitable model for some time to come.  However, a comparison of some general 
welfare statistics in the years leading up to the collapse of the state contrasted with the 
same figures gathered in the mid-2000s is telling.  Prior to the fall of Barre, the 
percentage of population with access to any sort of health facility was 28 percent.  In 
2003 that figure jumped up to almost 55 percent, according to the UNDP.27
 
   
It is unsurprising that money transfer and telecommunications enterprises remain the 
largest companies operating in Somalia. After 2001, the Hargeisa-based Dahabshiil 
Hawalaad firm became the largest of all Somali money transfer companies following 
the US closure of the then-giant Al Barakat remittance company for alleged ties to 
terrorism.  The adaptability of both Somali remitters as well as remittance companies 
                                                 
26 Kent, Randolph, Karin von Hippel, and Mark Bradbury. "Social Facilitation, Development and the 
Diaspora: Support for Sustainable Health Services in Somalia." London, UK: The International Policy 
Institute at King's College. 31. 
 
27 World Bank and United Nations Development Program. Socio-Economic Survey 2002-Somalia. 
Washington, DC: UNDP and World Bank, 2003. 
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was on display in the months following Al Barakat's closure, as there was virtually no 
drop-off in remittance and transfer services.  Over the long term, it was clear that the 
market was so competitive that the vacuum was filled immediately by other Hawalaad 
groups. 
 
 
6.4 ADRESSING POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS 
 
The discussion on the relationship between economic development and political 
stability in Somalia would quickly fill several volumes.  While this study seeks solely 
to explore the social constructs that have facilitated development in a territory without 
a central government, it should be remembered that the situation in Somalia has not 
benefited all Somalis equally.  Some limited studies have gone as far as to indicate 
that economic marginalization and political exclusion in Somalia have been catalyzed 
by "external" factors, focusing primarily on the sporadic and ill-planned interventions 
taken on by the international community, but also potentially by unsavory influences 
in the diaspora.28
 
  The recent links drawn between the Somali diaspora in Canada and 
Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden further illustrates the potentially 
nefarious objectives of some within the diaspora.   
However, these detrimental activities may also prod certain other segments of Somali 
society towards acceptances of a government. That is reflected in the desires of many 
                                                 
28 Webersik, Christian. "Differences That Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalized in Somalia." Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute, no. 74 (2004): 529. 
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successful businessmen to seek a return to some form of government, as evidenced by 
their support for the newly created Transitional National Government, before they 
become victim to the unique situation that originally facilitated their success.29  There 
is no question that at some level, certain Somali businessmen would like to see a 
central government in power that would reduce their overhead, particularly in terms of 
security.  There is also no question that many of those same businessmen have reaped 
benefits in the power vacuum of the past two decades, and would quickly become 
inhibiting towards efforts for government if they were not wholly agreeable to the 
proposed policies.30
 
   
However, the case of Somaliland provides a positive example of the potential 
relationship between diaspora and political stability in a burgeoning system.  Diaspora 
presence and investments have been recognized by the fledgling government of 
Somaliland as not only a valuable influx of resources, but also a major contributor to 
legitimacy of governance. The government in Hargeisa has offered substantial tax 
advantages on certain imports: particularly those used for development or 
infrastructure construction, and has allowed many within the diaspora to bypass 
several levels of bureaucracy if they are looking to invest in Somaliland real estate.31
                                                 
29 Le Sage, Andrew. "Somalia: Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia." Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 29 (2002): 134. 
 
Somalilanders in the diaspora are also regularly encouraged to visit home, via a waiver 
of airport taxes from the fledgling government, in order to facilitate some of the more 
intangible asset transfers, namely of outside knowledge and new ideas. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International 
Africa Institute, 2008. 177. 
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6.5 THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA? 
 
The future of development in Somalia, with or without a functioning government, is a 
frequently discussed subject among would-be entrepreneurs. In a further example of 
the compression of time and space through technology, many Somalis abroad and at 
home are increasingly participating in internet message boards to share ideas and 
opinions, often on future business prospects or endeavors in their home country.  Their 
ideas along with a quick survey of Somalia's resources indicate some likely avenues 
for development in the future, including tourism, fishing, and marine shipping 
facilities.  In the distant future, it is possible that private enterprise may undertake 
even more complex endeavors, including tapping into Somalia's believed energy 
resources or starting up large scale and technologically advanced privatized mining or 
quarrying firms.   
 
This hypothetical discussion of Somalia's future business endeavors merits a brief 
aside about the gradual evolution to more accessible services alluded to above. While 
the list of potential future business prospects in the preceding paragraph represent bear 
little direct implications for a sector like education, broadening and strengthening in 
other sectors may represent the only way to open the door for such development.  This 
could be through either business or philanthropy, for a sector such as education that is 
more public-benefitting.  This argument has been alluded to in prior sections of this 
paper, and harbors more potential than some other approaches for reconstructing 
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education in Somalia, notably the failed model of foreign aid agencies conducting 
education "interventions" espoused by Ali Abdi in 1998.32
 
 
Somaliland has seen the foundations of a tourism sector begin to appear, with the 
relatively newly constructed five-star Ambassador Hotel in Hargeisa serving as 
perhaps the most iconic indicator of a potentially profitable tourism sector. Several 
small hostels for independent travelers have also sprouted up in recent years, a 
testament to the region's relative stability.   
 
One of Somalia's traditional enterprises is fishing, however the industry suffered 
mightily under the Barre government, and unlike certain other sectors it has not 
flourished in the absence of a state. Today, Somali waters are one of the few on the 
planet that have been described as under-fished.  Estimates have claimed that Somalia 
is capable of producing 300,000 tons of fish annually, and while current statistics are 
difficult to come by, it is certain that fishermen are pulling in only a fraction of the 
water's capacity.33
 
  Expansion of private fishing operations is a long ways off, 
particularly with the problems surrounding piracy in Somali waters, but perhaps 
represents a future step of economic development along the path forged by the 
informal financial services and telecommunications endeavors. 
                                                 
32 Abdi, Ali. "Education in Somalia: History, Destruction, and Calls for Reconstruction." Comparative 
Education, no. 34 (1998): 338. 
33 MacCallum, Spencer. "Economic Development." In The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for 
Economic Development in the Horn of Africa. Ed. Michael Van Notten, 145-171. Trenton, NJ, 2005. 
The Red Sea Press Incorporated. 153. 
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Geographically, Somalia's largely underdeveloped 1600 miles of coastline affords a 
myriad of economic opportunities.  Investment in port facilities would also serve 
another major economic purpose other than improved fishing revenue. As noted by 
Spencer McCallum in Michael van Notten's posthumous 2004 release The Law of the 
Somalis, Ethiopia has been virtually landlocked since Eritrea's independence and has 
been forced to rely on the poorly managed and difficult-to-access port in Djibouti.  
According to MacCallum, African countries import an average of 2,000 pounds by sea 
per year per capita, while Ethiopia is currently only able to import around 20 pounds 
per person per year by sea.34
 
  Improved port facilities and road access in Somalia 
would certainly help address this potentially 50 million ton annual shortfall in 
Ethiopian import demands.  Improved ocean shipping access would most likely be a 
boon to the traditional pastoralists in Somalia as well, as many of their principal 
buyers are in the Arabian Gulf. 
Minerals and energy resources could represent another source of income in some 
future iteration of the territory of Somalia.  Gold, emeralds, and coal, present in 
reasonable quantities in Somalia, are often mined by hand.  It has been speculated that 
Somalia has rich deposits of copper, zinc, lead, talcum, rubies, and even uranium that 
are largely untouched.  There is evidence indicating the presence of energy resources 
as well.  Natural gas and oil were both believed to be present back when foreign 
energy firms were inspecting concessions prior to the collapse of the government.  
                                                 
34 MacCallum, Spencer. "Economic Development." In The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for 
Economic Development in the Horn of Africa. Ed. Michael Van Notten, 145-171. Trenton, NJ, 2005. 
The Red Sea Press Incorporated. 156. 
 112 
Tapping into hard resources such as oil, gas, and minerals will require a far higher 
degree of investment, which makes steadfast political stability a requisite.  Time will 
tell whether these particular avenues are explored. 
 
 
6.6 A Closing Note on Access and Diaspora-Driven Development 
 
It is evident that the majority of Somalis today have better access to financial and 
telecommunications services than they ever did under the rule of government. The 
argument that many Somalis also now have improved access to a number of other 
services such as water or electricity than they did in the years immediately following 
the collapse of the government can also be made.  This radiating effect of improved 
access in sectors in which diaspora entrepreneurs have become involved must be 
explored, encouraged, and amplified.   
 
While the evolution of technology over the past fifteen years has played a key role in 
the most drastic economic upswings within certain sectors in Somalia, the driving 
catalyst for these developments big or small has originated from the diaspora.  It is 
important to see the shift in how that money is being spent within the framework of 
diaspora-driven development in Somali.  While remittance recipients in Somalia were 
historically using the funds solely for consumption and survival-based spending, there 
was a gradual shift during which remittances went increasingly towards fueling 
investment in certain sectors, such as telecommunications, as well as small business 
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and real estate. The scope of diaspora-driven development seems to be continuing its 
expansion into sectors that distinctly blur the lines between business and social 
development.  These avenues of development, such as health or education, could 
prove to be the fastest and most effective methods for addressing many deficiencies 
caused by the absence of a state.  It is important not only to recognize the obstacles 
overcome by the Somali commercial sector, but to see the complexity of the system, 
the social networks abroad and at home, and their tenacity, enthusiasm, and inductive 
problem solving in facing the most challenging hardships. It is these intangibles that 
have facilitated varying degrees of success within an environment that, to an external 
observer, would seem to preclude survival, much less any success. 
  
The following chapter will conclude this paper by synthesizing the various previous 
discussions and highlighting the notion that diaspora-driven development has and will 
serve a most critical role along the path towards political stability and sustainable 
development in Somalia.  Broad policy recommendations will be made for both 
nations harboring substantial Somali diaspora populations as well as international 
organizations interested in forging development in the region. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The collapse of the state created a dangerous vacuum in Somalia, where initially 
lawlessness ruled and in which security and basic services were virtually nonexistent. 
However, the lack of government pushed people to rely on networks outside of the 
traditional state framework for their survival and livelihoods. While much of Somalia 
today remains essentially stateless, it is clearly not wholly anarchic. Repeated efforts on 
behalf of the international community to resuscitate a formal central government have 
faltered or failed outright, but the Somali people both at home and abroad have developed 
methods to cope with the ongoing status of uncertainty and instability.  The rise of a 
unique informal economy has facilitated a constant flow of diaspora-born revenue.  This 
revenue came as remittances helping families in Somalia survive, as well as larger 
diaspora investments that have managed to pay some notable economic dividends.  While 
many Somalis in the diaspora endeavor to one day return to a peaceful Somalia, this 
nostalgic desire is tempered by the knowledge that this goal is unreachable without 
substantial change.  However, it is evident that the precursors to this substantial change 
could be occurring right now.  
 
We have witnessed the opening of a number of economic avenues into an otherwise un-
accessible market.  Vacancy of governance in conjunction with the overarching presence 
of certain tight societal and cultural bonds has coalesced in Somalia to form some 
semblance of a stable mechanism. Somalia's private sector experience, driven largely by a 
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far-reaching and motivated diaspora, suggests that it may be easier than is commonly 
thought for certain services, evidenced particularly in finance and telecommunications, to 
function where government is extremely weak or absent.  Can these unique avenues for 
economic development open the door for more politically-oriented development?  The 
evolution of the Somali diaspora's commercial involvement at home indicates that the 
door may already be opening.  Extensive commercial ties between the diaspora and 
commercial sector have resulted in a vested interest on behalf of those diaspora 
entrepreneurs to create and maintain a degree of order.  The territory of Somaliland has 
been able to largely bypass much of the tensions and conflict that have enveloped other 
parts of the region in recent years, perhaps due in large part to a less incendiary mixture 
of clan and sub-clans residing there, but also likely related to that territory's engagement 
of its diaspora initially at the commercial level, then at the political level. 
 
In terms of on-the-ground economic activities, trust and bonds within and between clans 
and families has become the vital pillar on which many peoples' livelihood is based under 
conditions of perpetual conflict and instability. These bonds, which begin at the most 
basic of social levels, have broadened and extended upwards with the wide dispersion of 
the diaspora and the diaspora's subsequent desires to get involved at home.  These bonds 
directly result in reducing risk and cutting down on transaction costs between economic 
actors operating in different segments and sectors of the economy, which in results in 
increasingly diverse working relationships.  The nature of these relationships is akin to 
the types of relationships needed to forge any sort of governance among different groups 
of people. 
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The fierce loyalty of Somalis to their families and clans has been the catalyst for much of 
the violence and destabilization of traditional political systems in place in the country 
over the past decades, but it has also largely facilitated interesting and effective methods 
of survival and sometimes, a degree of comparative prosperity.  Somali enclaves across 
the globe have funneled remittances to family and business partners at home, in a sense 
creating a modern echo of how a nomadic society survived in Somalia when the family 
members were separated by a mere few kilometers, instead of thousands of kilometers as 
is the case today.  The informal economy system functions in Somalia because of 
established trust that is not, unlike formal financial networks, founded on solely on 
financial transactions.  Rather, it involves cultural obligations across multiple layers of 
the community.  Increasingly, these obligations are manifesting themselves at the global 
level, as opposed to the village or community level.   
 
The evolution of these social relations based on cultural and ethnic ties has widened the 
scope of Somalia's informal economy from remittance-based survival to legitimate 
business entrepreneurism.  These social relations now serve as the vital bond between 
businesses and people, permeating every level of each market and particularly within the 
avenues of transnational remittances and investment. At the lower levels of economic 
scale, they are more heavily reliant on clan ties and affiliations, but at the more 
macroeconomic levels, patron-client relationships grow increasingly common.  Stability, 
or rather trust, originating at the more microeconomic level of remittances has filtered up 
and emboldened entrepreneurs to explore avenues that may have been more of a fringe 
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area in both terms of business and acceptable societal linkages in the first years following 
the collapse of the state.  From basic financial services to telecommunications and now to 
electricity, potable water, health services, or education, the private sector in Somalia is 
attenuating many of the dilemmas fomented by ineffective or nonexistent governance. 
 
Interestingly enough, the average Somali today, entrepreneur or otherwise, still has little-
to-no access to "formal" financial institutions but the informal outlets are incredibly 
prevalent and easily accessible.  As was argued earlier in this paper, the most prominent, 
tangible aspect of this mechanism is the Hawalaad system. The Hawalaad has 
simultaneously served as a humanitarian relief conduit, development catalyst, and basic 
financial institution for people across Somalia as well as Somalis dispersed across the 
globe.  Surprisingly, this lack of access to formal financial institutions within Somalia is 
remarkably similar to the lack of access present when a government existed.  Somalia's 
merchants and entrepreneurs today are not only acclimated to this scenario, but many 
flourish under it. In addition, while Somalis still rely on the Hawalaad system's trust, 
simplicity, and high cost-effectiveness, remittance companies have rapidly begun to 
function much more like the banks that are so desperately needed inside their country.  
This raises a question in itself; how much of this failed system can be deemed as 
exceptionally irregular in an environment of ongoing instability such as Somalia? While 
the Somali case is certainly not enviable and neither should it be portrayed as a budding 
system rife with potential, residents have found means of coping successfully despite the 
political and economic turbulence that has pervaded for the better part of the past two 
decades. 
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The diaspora-driven expansion of financial services and telecommunications in Somalia 
has facilitated the diversifying economic growth. Both of the aforementioned sectors are 
also mutually beneficial: remittance companies now have better access to remote parts of 
the country and more reliable services because they have communications with all of 
their agents. The informal finance sector has also been a boon to local businessmen 
operating in all different sectors contending with insecurity.  Without any public 
protection services, the actual transportation of funds would entail serious risks.  The 
Hawalaad companies, however, allow businesspeople to move money throughout the 
country for purposes of trade by transferring funds through their complex computerized 
finance networks and not through physical means.  This represents another secondary 
catalyst for increased diversification in investment in Somalia. 
 
Some of the larger business ventures, such as telecommunications, often involve 
transnational partnerships, and diaspora business people have served as an important link 
to international markets.  These 'mobile businessmen,' traveling between Somalia, 
Europe, and America, have facilitated whole new dimensions of development in the 
Somali economy.1
                                                 
1 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International Africa 
Institute, 2008. 177. 
  Telecommunications infrastructure, health clinics, and roads, all 
highlight the capacity of diaspora entrepreneurialism through predominantly informal 
avenues to broaden in scope, evolve, and provide benefit for the public good.  In doing 
so, there should be some correlated capacity for political stabilization within the 
framework of a thriving informal economy. While any endeavor towards a unified, 
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centralized state-driven political system in Somalia has been rife with hazards and 
unforeseen problems, the commercial diaspora's interpretations of Somali societal values 
such as cooperation and community stand a far better chance than the more localized 
construal. The fact that the commercial diaspora has been able to play such a substantial 
role in supplanting many basic functions of the state furthers this argument. 
 
Many of the minimal essential elements of governance, while not met in full, have been 
addressed on one dimension or another in this system.  Without a strong governing body 
that can legitimize itself to most of its citizens, these avenues of diaspora involvement 
can and should be a key point in aggregating political capital and legitimacy.  Localized 
political "authorities" now range from the traditional clan elders to the militia leaders and 
strongmen to globalized Somali businessmen and traders. What has emerged is a fluid, 
localized society that relies on authority or direction from a very diverse yet intrinsically 
related group of actors.  The diaspora entrepreneur has emerged as a unifier or at least as 
an actor with unifying potential, with diaspora assets and influence playing key roles in 
day-to-day activities for all parties in Somalia.  If there is a sustained improvement in 
Somalia's security and political situation, it should be expected that many among the 
remitting diaspora population will seek a return to their homeland, converting those 
remittances into strictly domestically-sourced investments.  While this dynamic would 
need improved regulation to sustain growth, it could also afford an additional degree to 
the government. 
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One of the main results of state failure in Somalia is that remittances have come to play 
the role of a sort of social safety net, preventing economic collapse and abating some of 
the hardships faced by Somalis in the face of the tribulations that have engulfed their 
homeland over the past two decades.  It has also been demonstrated that within the 
context of Somalia, remittances are more important and more effective in aiding with 
pure survival as well as improving people's livelihoods with more success than other 
external intervention in the form of international aid or development efforts.  
 
International interventions have been inconsistent and the transitional Somali government 
has yet to return much to the region. Public roads have not been constructed, public 
health clinics rarely built, and public schools are rarely established, especially outside of 
the urban areas.  Governments interested in forging sustainable stability and lasting peace 
in Somalia should adopt advisory roles, relying on varied Somali inputs including as 
many facets of the diaspora population as possible.  Somalia's informal financial transfer 
system is important to political stability, reconstruction, development, and improved 
livelihoods in the region.  Additionally, the gradual professionalization and formalization 
of Somalia's financial sector should be extremely encouraging for host countries that 
have been suspicious or condemning of the system in recent years. 
 
It is crucial to maintain and protect the diaspora's ability to remit money to family 
members as well as business partners at a low cost.  Hawalaad firms must meet the 
financial and administrative regulations that are required in whichever country they 
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happen to operate in.  However, regulating nations should be well-advised of the 
extraordinary role played by these firms and how they operate within Somalia. 
Regulating nations have a crucial responsibility in ensuring that their citizens and 
residents can financially support their families as well as their entrepreneurial endeavors 
back in Somalia, as long as they operate within the framework of the host country's law.  
Somali Hawalaad firms and diaspora organizations have already made contact with many 
regulating parties concerning their rights and desires to operate in full legality.  In terms 
of regulating the Hawalaad system within the host country, it is remarkable how many 
record-keeping and administrative guidelines have already crept into the picture.  From 
the remittance-senders' standpoint, the system remains fast and effective, and from the 
host country's standpoint, the system is legal and less worrisome. 
 
Efforts should be made to encourage involvement by Somalia's global diaspora, as their 
societal and cultural links put them in a unique position to foster investment and 
development.  It remains to be seen whether children of migrants continue to remit 
money to relatives they've never met in countries they've never been to.  This represents 
one of the largest long-term reasons to foster as much Somali diaspora interaction with 
the home country as possible, as continued ties will likely equate to continued 
remittances. 
 
It should be noted that a danger exists when the diaspora helps fund things like education 
and health for individuals and communities, political forces are less inclined to provide 
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these basic services, as they are less accountable for them.2  Alleviating this worry 
requires steady-handed support from international organizations and flexibility on the 
behalf of host country governments. Those requisites are critical for continuing some of 
the positive directions taken during the evolution of Somalia's diaspora-homeland 
relationship, while cutting down on dependency as well as redundant investment.  The 
diaspora's largely unplanned investments have resulted in some waste and duplicity3
 
.  
This is not an unexpected occurrence in a wholly open and unregulated market, but an 
area in which development organizations could serve an immensely beneficial purpose in 
reducing its' frequency.   
For international development organizations, the capabilities of certain commercial 
sectors in Somalia to flourish under the harshest circumstances should be a rallying point 
and source of guidance in other reconstruction efforts.  It may indeed take less effort than 
commonly thought for the diaspora-driven development systems seen in 
telecommunications and finance to expand into other sectors of development. 
 
International development organizations should ensure that diaspora avenues of 
involvement in Somalia continue to evolve.  Organizations operating in a role peripheral 
to diaspora-relations may be able to encourage further developmental capacities in the 
financial sector, including perhaps the possibilities of savings, micro-finance plans, 
business loans, or even insurance.  While contingent on a greater deal of stability than 
                                                 
2 Lindley, Anna. "The Influence of Migration, Remittances and Diaspora Donations on Education in Somali 
Society" in "Remittances and Economic Development in Somalia: An Overview." Ed. Maimbo, Samuel.  
The World Bank Social Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction, no. 38 (2006): 9-17. 
3 Bradbury, Mark. African Issues: Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington, Indiana: The International Africa 
Institute, 2008. 178. 
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currently present in the region, these endeavors could potentially interact directly with 
remittances, creating a multifaceted approach that would have positive consequences for 
households, communities, and the Somali economy on the whole. 
 
One might hypothesize about the devastation caused by a similar breakdown, in severity 
and duration, of state and economic institutions in any another country.  However, just 
those events in Somalia have resulted in the exact opposite, a bustling, evolving locally-
styled yet globally-driven economy that has proven resilient for almost two decades. 
However, this optimism must still be tempered, and said without assuming that relative 
success in Somalia equates to a general notion of overall well-being.   
 
 
Regardless of the successes or failures of any future iterations of governance in Somalia, 
there is no question that the societal bonds and capabilities of the informal economy call 
into question many basic assumptions about social reality in the territory.  The notion of 
trust, in the Somali context, clearly cannot be replicated or encouraged to develop 
anywhere else on the planet.  However, there is a lesson to learn from the capacity of the 
diaspora, both economically and politically, in the conflict, post-conflict, or perpetually-
conflicted state.  In this volatile environment, Somalis have relied on their extensive 
kinship ties and on members of their own groups to build social networks that continue to 
expand.  This social strategy may be common in contemporary Somalia, but also 
increasingly characterizes informal trade elsewhere in the African continent and other 
conflict-ridden parts of the world.  An appeal to non-state controlled parts of society 
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perhaps represents an avenue to explore other weak and failing states rife with ethnic 
violence.  In some ways, the successes in Somalia demonstrate that much in the way of 
engendered distrust or animosity is dismissed if indirect relationships are forged.  An 
informal economy directly facilitates these relationships.   
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